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I.

INTRODUCTION

Anyone who ever wanted to become a lawyer while reading TO
KILL A MOCKINGBIRD, or who saw law as a tool for responding to
injustice, probably drew inspiration from the profession’s commitment
to zealous advocacy. Zealous advocacy is core to the popular ethos of
what good lawyering is, and yet for many areas of law, it is only vaguely
defined, and is honored too often in the breach. Zeal may be absent
because it is not part of the legal culture, especially in the underresourced, over-burdened court systems affecting some of our most
vulnerable populations, very much including the court system that
oversees immigration cases. Two central ideas this Article explores are
why the legal culture matters, and what role a well-articulated standard
and broadly held commitment to zealous advocacy could play in the
specific context of immigration court.
Zealousness has at least two manifestations. One is simply a kind
of lawyering thoroughness, where lawyers use all tools available to
advance their client’s interests—and indeed, it is now officially housed
in the ethical rules under the principle of diligence. While zeal-asdiligence is not easy, it is also not terribly controversial. The other
manifestation of zeal is in pushing boundaries and taking risks for
clients, which quickly becomes far more controversial as it calls upon
lawyers to tiptoe up to the edges of ethically permissible behavior
instead of remaining in a safe, neutral zone. Often cast in negative
lawyer-as-hired-gun-terms, this form of zeal is complex, and may still be
both client-centered and justice-oriented, especially where clients lack

KEYES (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

4/12/2015 9:27 PM

ZEALOUS ADVOCACY

477

power relative to the system or systems they are confronting.1 One
example may better explain these two aspects of zeal, and show their
significance:
Cynthia had lived in the United States for seventeen years, working as a
nanny. Along the way she married, and later divorced, a fellow Jamaican with
whom she had two daughters. She called the police on him once during a fight,
and the police arrested them both. In court, each accepted a deferred sentencing
agreement, agreeing to do twenty hours of community service to make the issue
go away. Cynthia’s older daughter is excelling at school and won a scholarship
to a private high school where she plays flute in a traveling orchestra. Her
younger daughter suffers from juvenile rheumatoid arthritis, and Cynthia has
managed her care over the years. Recently, police pulled Cynthia over for a
traffic stop while she was driving in the predominantly white neighborhood
where she works, found that she had two IDs with two different names, and
placed her under arrest. They notified immigration enforcement officers, leading
to her removal hearing because the deferred sentencing agreement constituted a
domestic violence conviction that made her deportable.
Now Cynthia is in immigration court. On any given day in immigration
courts around the country, dozens, if not hundreds, of immigrants in removal
proceedings concede the allegations filed by the Department of Homeland
Security on a charging document called the Notice to Appear, in a process that
takes only a moment. Many, if not most, of those immigrants will concede that
the Government has the legal basis to deport them. And with that, in less than
a minute, the Government has met its burden, and the immigrant can be
deported unless there is some form of relief he or she can seek.2
But Cynthia’s lawyer did not concede the basis for deportation, even
though the lawyer knew that she did, in fact, lack status—simply because it was
still the Government’s burden. Now, instead of the Government proving its case
within a minute by relying on a concession from the immigrant’s attorney, the
process stopped and the judge had to hear arguments concerning the sufficiency
of the Government’s evidence supporting the conviction. An individual without
legal immigration status can win her case if the Government cannot, in fact,
meet its burden, without ever getting to the question of whether the immigrant is
eligible for any kind of relief from removal.3 Let us imagine that in this case,
though, the Government was able to meet its burden, meaning the Government
1

See generally W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (2004),
for an excellent overview of zeal and its critics, among other complicated ethical issues.
Kate Cruse also thoughtfully explores the tensions among client-centeredness, zeal
and justice in Kate Cruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Centered
Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2006).
2
Jennifer Lee Koh, Rethinking Removability, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1809 (2013).
3
The Government can refile charging documents with better evidence in the
future if it so chooses.
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had now made its case against Cynthia.
The story continues momentarily, but note here how this decision
to deny the charge of removability disrupts norms of performance with
lawyering that differs sharply from the daily mill of cases churning
through the immigration removal system. But this lawyer is simply
zealously, if unexpectedly, using all the tools she has at her disposal.
This choice is only modestly controversial—many lawyers argue that a
duty of candor to the tribunal requires them to concede removability
if they know that the Government can ultimately amass evidence to
sustain the charge, or if they think it would be frivolous to litigate the
charge—but here the lawyer sees this as a weak but not frivolous
strategy, and worthy of putting the Government to its burden in case
the proof is not present.
Cynthia now tries to avoid deportation by showing she is eligible for the
form of relief known as Cancellation of Removal, an application she
affirmatively makes to the Government. She is likely eligible because she has been
here more than ten years, and her removal would cause “exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship”4 to her U.S. citizen daughter with arthritis. But
there is one wrinkle: the application asks about any arrests, and in response to
that question, Cynthia told her lawyer that she was once arrested for theft for
taking her ex-husband’s car without his permission. A guilty plea for this would
make her ineligible for Cancellation. Cynthia said her defender “sorted it all
out” for her, but she does not remember what happened at the one court
appearance she had, just that the problem seemed to go away.
The lawyer looked in the criminal courts of Virginia, where Cynthia had
lived since coming to the U.S., and found no evidence of an arrest or subsequent
charges. Between that and Cynthia’s vagueness about what had happened, the
lawyer decided she had no duty to dig deeper with Cynthia for details that could
help unearth any conviction that might or might not exist. The Government,
despite running Cynthia’s fingerprints through its fairly comprehensive system,
found no evidence of a theft either. Cynthia won her case, got a green card, and
stayed in the U.S. to work and to raise and care for her daughters.
This second ethical decision, about how far to dig for the theft
conviction, is more controversial. Here, the duty to present a truthful
application to the court conflicted with the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to
her client, and many lawyers would have erred on the side of
interrogating the client to be as forthcoming as possible with the
tribunal. Indeed, had Cynthia’s lawyer asked her a few more questions,
she could have found out that the charge was, strangely, adjudicated
4

This level of hardship is a requirement for one form of relief from deportation,
Cancellation of Removal and Adjustment of Status for Certain Nonpermanent
Residents. INA § 240B(b)(1)(D); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2013).
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in family court alongside the divorce itself—and she could easily have
produced the document that would have made Cynthia ineligible for
relief. Her diligence would have resulted in her client’s deportation,
but the lawyer would have secured the court’s respect for her honesty
and integrity, something that likely matters profoundly to a lawyer who
appears before that judge time and time again.
By contrast, the lawyer ran the risk of being hauled up on ethics
charges by creeping toward the edge of the murky line between
knowing about a fact she had a duty to tell the tribunal,5 recklessly
disregarding the existence of a relevant fact,6 or deciding that there was
enough ambiguity present that she did not “know” about a conviction.7
This lawyer’s choice of interpreting unclear rules in favor of her client
is risky to her, but zealousness, as she defined it, demanded she go with
that less safe choice.
There is no question that zealous representation has profound
consequences in immigration court, where clients may contend with
prolonged detention, family separation, and ultimately, for many,
deportation with its many attendant losses.8 Attorneys generally know
that zealousness is within their box of tools as they represent clients,
and that it is required by the rules of professional conduct in so far as
lawyers are to act diligently on their clients’ behalves. But zealousness
is often tempered by duties to the tribunal, and by attendant role
confusion caused by competing duties to clients and the system as a
whole. The broader legal context exacerbates these forces, where
court systems and the ethical rules increasingly favor more conciliatory
5

Model Rule 3.3(a)(1) requires her not to put forth facts she knows to be false.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1)(1983).
6
The immigration court ethical rules governing the lawyers’ conduct go farther
than the Model Rules, as discussed in Part 5, infra.
7
Comment 8 to Model Rule 3.3 permits lawyers to resolve doubts in favor of their
clients. Comment 8 in its entirety reads:
The prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer
knows that the evidence is false. A lawyer’s reasonable belief that
evidence is false does not preclude its presentation to the trier of fact. A
lawyer’s knowledge that evidence is false, however, can be inferred from
the circumstances. See Rule 1.0(f). Thus, although a lawyer should
resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or other evidence in favor
of the client, the lawyer cannot ignore an obvious falsehood.

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT.
8

This Article does not intend to rank practice areas by difficulty, as other practice
areas share many of these same challenges and comparable consequences, such as
abuse and neglect proceedings. Indeed, as I have shared earlier versions of this Article
with lawyers in diverse fields, they have all painfully recognized these issues and
identified closely with the challenges described in this Article. Clearly, the forces
against zealous advocacy permeate far more than the immigration bar, and are worthy
of intensive conversation across legal practice areas.
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modes of litigation.
Moreover, while some pressures against
zealousness are endemic to any system with a relatively small number
of repeat players, others result from by skyrocketing immigration court
dockets that overwhelm both judges and lawyers for the Government,
by widespread, powerful narratives that assume everything from the
feebleness of the constitution in immigration court to the presumed
removability of the immigrants who appear there. Indeed, in
overstretched court systems like this one, it may sometimes seem that
zealousness is disfavored entirely. This Article takes the stance,
however, that given the stakes in immigration litigation, zealousness is
required for true attorney effectiveness, no matter how difficult,
uncomfortable, or costly it may be, and therefore lawyers in the
immigration system urgently need to understand and overcome those
barriers to zealous advocacy.
The complexity of these issues, the scope of the consequences,
and the importance of a well-defined norm of zealousness all call to
mind the world of criminal defense, which has a split personality
important to understand. Although all lawyers are bound by rules of
professional conduct, criminal defense has a strong history of
establishing norms that challenge defenders to rise above the ethical
floor often set by those rules, where effectiveness is defined at a
minimally effective level. Defenders have created a culture whereby
the best defenders stake their reputations on their zeal and on the
clarity of their understanding that they stand with their clients against
the weight of other forces in the overall legal system. It is true that
examples of poor-quality defenders plague the criminal defense bar,
and even well-intentioned defenders find themselves unable to live up
to their desired level of representation because of impossibly high
workloads. Moreover, the law itself defines effectiveness far below the
standards of the best defenders, thanks to the extraordinary
permissiveness created by Strickland9 and the cases interpreting it,
which serve to separate legally-sufficient “effectiveness” from truly
effective lawyering. Legally-sufficient effectiveness is a terribly low
standard, while truly effective lawyering is a demandingly high one. In
a context where legally-sufficient effectiveness might have become the
norm, however, defenders have actively sought and defined a much
higher standard of practice, which involves oftentimes aggressive
interpretations of the rules of ethics in favor of zealous advocacy. Part
II of this Article explores the lengthy, sophisticated debate around the
justifications (or lack thereof) for such zealousness, looking at factors

9

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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such as resources, procedural advantages, political and psychological
advantages, as well as the legitimacy of the immigration court ethical
rules themselves.10
True effectiveness (as opposed to legally-sufficient effectiveness)
is not easy in immigration litigation. Immigration lawyers11 face a
constant and varied set of ethical challenges while working in an
exceptionally difficult practice context: administrative law whose
complexity is often likened to the tax code; often intransigent
bureaucracies; limited judicial review; the demanding solopractitioner and small-firm business-model that dominates the
immigration bar; the presence of trauma; complex cultural and
linguistic barriers; and so forth. The uniqueness of immigration
practice also makes it likely that immigration lawyers are less likely to
be held to high standards than their counterparts in other areas of
practice, for many reasons, but especially because those who pay the
price for ineffective assistance are often deported and unable to hold
counsel accountable.12
Complicating matters further, immigration practitioners operate
in a unique form of the adversarial system, lacking some of the critical
tools and protections—limited though they are—that their closest
colleagues, criminal defenders, possess. These limitations certainly
arise from the different (oftentimes lesser) constitutional protections

10

Here, this Article applies a framework developed by ethicist and legal
philosopher David Luban to justify including immigration with criminal defense as
meriting the choice of “zealous advocacy” and not “litigation fairness” as the baseline
for resolving ethical dilemmas. See Part II.B, infra; see also David Luban, Are Criminal
Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1998). This Article sidesteps the question of
whether different practice areas might adopt different principles, or whether the bar
should have a uniform approach to ethics, as this is a subject richly explored and part
of ongoing scholarly conversations elsewhere.
11
I use the term “immigration lawyers,” but as will be discussed infra in Part Bthere
are several categories of non-lawyers who can practice in immigration court, including
students, accredited representatives and “reputable individuals.” 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1
(2008). Likewise, immigration prosecutors within the Department of Homeland
Security certainly practice immigration law, but for ease of identification, I am calling
them prosecutors, and their adversaries “immigration lawyers.”
12
This phenomenon is discussed in Part III, infra. An empirical study would be
well-merited on this point, but it is interesting here to note that immigrants do have an
incentive to file bar complaints to get their cases reopened under Matter of Lozada,
19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1988) (permitting a case to be reopened where an
immigrant demonstrates prejudice from a prior attorney’s ineffective assistance of
counsel). Lozada, however, requires that the immigrant still be present in the U.S.,
requires (most likely) that the immigrant has secured a second lawyer to understand
about the options that may be available under Lozada, and, most important to this
discussion of incentives for effectiveness, does not require that a disciplinary action
actually result against the prior attorney.
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surrounding immigration proceedings, but they also arise from the
posture of immigration cases themselves. Specifically, as Cynthia’s
story shows, although advocates may see themselves as defending their
clients against removal, they are affirmatively seeking benefits and have
burdens of proof that can, and often do, put their duties to their clients
in direct opposition to their duties as officers of the court. These and
other ethical issues create ethical dilemmas for immigration litigators,
but a broadly-held commitment to zealous advocacy would encourage
litigators to explore and act at the edges of ethically permissible
behavior to ensure truly effective representation of their clients.
Part III addresses the question of why this kind of powerful
standard-setting matters. Again, the world of criminal defense shows
how voluntary standards help counteract the erosion of effectiveness
that occurs when the legally-sufficient understanding of “effectiveness”
is so poor. While not halting the forces of erosion, the standards
provide a healthy counter-force. Likewise, the articulation of a
heightened standard of effectiveness for immigration attorneys, one
that elevates zealous advocacy, could help the practice of immigration
in numerous ways. Not only would it bolster, support and encourage
the work being done by the many excellent, zealous immigration
advocates currently practicing, but it would provide a measure against
which the dominant-narrative “bad immigration lawyers” can be
judged.
Part IV begins the examination of ways that such a commitment
to zealous advocacy might help make difficult choices amid the
challenges of immigration litigation. Those challenges may be
grouped into ones where zealousness can make a difference, and those
where the very structure of immigration law and the ethical rules may
make truly client-centered zealous advocacy impossible. These
dilemmas will help show the ways that immigration law itself challenges
practitioners from adhering to often conflicting ethical duties, let
alone achieving a higher standard of effectiveness. This Article calls
upon the immigration bar to make zealous advocacy a broadly-shared
and well-articulated norm of practice. For the seemingly impossible
situations, where lawyers simply cannot meet their competing duties to
the clients and to the court, law reform efforts may be needed as well—
with some as simple as fine-tuning the governing ethical rules. The
untenable contrasts and conflicts set forth in this Article require a shift
in the laws and structures so that lawyers in immigration court have the
possibility of playing their multiple roles responsibly, something
precluded by the current laws and structures.
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JUSTIFYING ZEALOUSNESS

It is broadly understood that the various ethical duties imposed
upon lawyers are frequently in tension with each other. At their core,
many of these tensions exist between those duties owed to the client
and those owed to the court or legal system generally. Over the
centuries, there has been an ongoing struggle between two approaches
to this central tension. One approach holds zealous duty to the client
as the primary duty, one that is only secondarily tempered by duties to
the court or legal system generally (hereinafter called the “zealous
advocate” approach).13 The other is an approach where the duties to
the court and legal system are more important. This second approach
aligns the lawyer and the court as sharing the ultimate objectives of
truth and justice (hereinafter referred to as the “litigation fairness”
approach).14
The decline of the zealous advocate model, as noted in Part 1,
manifests in many ways, but most notably in the revision of rules of
conduct to minimize or omit references to zeal. As two lawyers note:
“The demise and disappearance of ‘zeal’ from our ethical rules is more
than a matter of semantics. In fact, it is evidence of a fundamental
paradigm shift that is and has been occurring in our legal system.”15
One powerful intentionally-articulated counterpoint is in the practice
of criminal defense, where zealous advocacy retains its power. This
Article now briefly sketches out this debate, describing “litigation
fairness” and the justifications for it, and contrasting it with the zealous
advocacy approach, before assessing the extent to which either model
is appropriate in the immigration court context. This Article cannot
possibly do justice to the nuances of the various models or to the
sophisticated debates among them, but aims to provide just enough
context to be instructive to those who are not immersed in ethics
literature to understand that there is a robust alternative framework
urging lawyers to be less uniquely focused on client-centered advocacy.

13

Carol Rice Andrews, Ethical Limits on Civil Litigation Advocacy: A Historical
Perspective, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381 (2012). William Simon underscores the
longevity of these themes, but notes that they are not either/or propositions: “There
has never been a consensus about where to draw the line between these two aspects of
the lawyer’s role, and the two have always been in tension within the professional
culture.” William Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1133
(1988).
14
Andrews, supra note 13. .
15
Lawrence J. Vilardo & Vincent E. Doyle III, Where Did the Zeal Go? 38 A.B.A LITIG.
53, 56 (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/litigation_
journal/2011_12/fall/where_did_zeal_go.html.
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A. Competing Approaches to Professional Conduct
1. Alternatives to Zealous Advocacy
Various approaches to professional conduct recognize the ways in
which ethical duties sometimes conflict, and choose “first-order” moral
values, such as truth and justice, as the guiding principle to resolve any
conflicts, instead of placing zealous advocacy to the client first.16
Although the variations on this are diverse, for the sake of simplicity I
will focus on one described as “litigation fairness.”17 As one scholar has
written, “[t]he lawyer still has a duty to zealously advocate for the
client’s interest and position, but the duty of zeal should not be allowed
to be a justification for lawyer behavior that imposes significant costs
on the legal system and society in general.”18 Fairness to the court
encompasses such characteristics as reasonable behavior, truth (as to
both law and fact), and merit (again, as to both law and fact).19
Premised upon a vision that two adversaries have comparable levels of
power, litigation fairness suggests that a lawyer may not need to
unleash every weapon in a brutal struggle for the client’s interests.20
Carol Rice Andrews has explored this concept in depth,
considered its long history, and has suggested that a distinct but
encompassing duty that encapsulates what it means to be fair to the
court is the concept of “just cause.”21 “Just cause” means assuring that
an action is “reasonable, honest, objectively meritorious, and properly
motivated.”22 A French ecclesiastical oath from the thirteenth century
cautions against knowingly taking cases that are “not just,” and while
16

Wendel, supra note 1.
“Litigation fairness” is but one name and approach for multiple critiques of
zealous advocacy. A particularly important approach that shares some characteristics
of this model is that of William Simon who offers deep critiques of what he calls the
“dominant model” of zealous advocacy, discussed further below, but nicely
summarized in Wendel, supra note 1. Compare Andrews, supra note 13, with William
Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1085–87 (1988).
18
John S. Dzienkowski, Ethical Decisionmaking and the Design of the Rules of Ethics, 42
HOFSTRA L. REV. 55, 75 (2013).
19
“Over the centuries, the concept of litigation fairness has included different
duties and standards of conduct, including reasonable behavior, truth, just cause,
proper motive, and objective merit.” Andrews, supra note 13, at 383.
20
See Richard Marcus, Cooperation and Litigation: Thoughts on the American
Experience, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 821 (2013).
21
Andrews, supra note 13, at 387. Andrews examines this concern for the
“justness” of a legal action in an interesting examination of historical records, from
the Justinian oath, through the French ecclesiastical oaths from the 13th
century,”[e]very single advocate shall swear that he will faithfully perform his duties;
that he will not support cases that are unjust or militate against his conscience.” Id.
22
Id.
17
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demanding duties to the client, sets forth many more duties to the
court itself.23 As Andrews notes summarizing developments in both the
English and French contexts: “Truth and reasonable behavior were
paramount duties from the very beginning of the profession in both
cultures. . . . Client concerns were often unstated, and when stated,
the client duties, including zealous advocacy, were expressly
subordinate to the lawyer’s duties to the court.”24 As the various legal
oaths moved closer to the modern age, a similar emphasis continued.
The 1816 oath from Geneva formed the basis for the Field Code and
U.S. professional responsibility duties later on. This oath concerned
itself primarily with the justness of the litigation and the lawyer’s duties
to the court, although as noted below, conceives of criminal defense as
meriting something different.25
Such a focus on the “just cause” of the action is clearly consistent
with zealous advocacy where the cause is, in the lawyer’s reasonable
view, “just”—of particular note here is that the lawyer’s view must be a
reasonable one, and this mitigates against the fear that zeal is the last
refuge of unscrupulous lawyers. However, the litigation fairness
approach also recognizes that zealous advocacy is likely to be the duty
“most at odds with the lawyer’s duties to the court.”26 When imposed,
these duties to the court “have been paramount over any conflicting
client duties.”27
This primacy of duties to the court marks a change from the
earliest presentation of legal ethics in the Justinian Oath from the sixth
century, where duties to the court were seen as tempering the primary
duty of zealous advocacy.28 The Oath reads, in part, that
[T]hey will undertake with all their power and strength, to
carry out for their clients what they consider to be just and
true, doing everything which it is possible for them to do.
However, they, with their knowledge and skill, shall not
prosecute a lawsuit with a bad conscience when they know
that the case entrusted to them is dishonest or utterly
hopeless or composed of false allegations.29

23

Id. at 396–97 (quoting 23 SACRORUM CONCILIORUM: NOVA ET AMPLISSIMA
in JOSIAH HENRY BENTON, THE LAWYER’S OFFICIAL OATH AND

COLLECTIO, as translated
OFFICE 9 (1909).
24
25
26
27
28
29

Id. at 401.
Id. at 400.
Id. at 386.
Id. at 383.
Id.
Andrews, supra note 14, at 389 (quoting the Justinian code).
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The Justinian Oath thus strikes a balance in favor of the client while
recognizing the importance of lawyerly integrity, without which the
system would be degraded by zeal. The different balance struck by
litigation fairness has less trust that zealousness (with integrity) would
be to the benefit of the overall system.
Litigation fairness does not necessarily proscribe all zealous
advocacy, and certainly not in all instances. For example, requiring
reasonable behavior is, with very few exceptions, not inconsistent with
zealous advocacy. Nor is a zealous advocate likely to be overly
conscribed by a duty to avoid offensiveness in treatment of judges and
adversaries. Likewise, zealous advocates may reasonably be convinced
of the justness of their cause, and not simply be shilling for lying
clients, meeting that notion of “proper motivation” that Andrews
characterizes alongside just cause as part of duties to the court.30
There are many times, however, where putting the needs of the
system before the needs of the client makes the two models
incompatible. This is especially true in immigration court where the
overburdened, under-resourced system would benefit greatly in terms
of efficiency and caseload management if lawyers filed fewer motions,
allowed the Government to meet its burden easily, consented to
abbreviated client testimony to finish hearings more quickly, and so
forth. Zealous advocacy in such a setting does impose significant
burdens on the tribunal itself, and all players in the system are surely
aware of those burdens because years-long docket backlogs and understaffing of the immigration courts are widely noted phenomena,31 to
the dismay of the Government and advocates alike. Thus, immigration
lawyers who choose to zealously advocate make a choice at odds with
the needs of the system itself—an instance of litigation fairness
clashing squarely with zealous advocacy.
The litigation fairness model has been ascendant in American
legal culture, and within the ethical literature. Important voices such
as William Simon have developed sophisticated arguments for the
notion that all players in the adversarial system should define
themselves as working toward justice in the system, instead of putting
client interests first and foremost—although Simon recognizes that
once a worthy client is chosen, a lawyer may advocate fully to achieve

30

Andrews, supra note 13 at 386.
See, e.g., Zoe Tilleman, Immigration Courts Backlog Grows as Obama Prepares
Executive Action, NAT’L L. J. (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nationallawjournal.com
/id=1202677017577/Immigration-Courts-Backlog-Grows-as-Obama-PreparesExecutive-Action#ixzz3RHYsDPNc.
31
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justice.32 In this view, lawyers can discern what justice looks like from
case to case, and matter to matter, and should commit to working
toward that result.
The litigation-fairness model also shows up in recent reforms to
the Model Rules, state rules and contested understandings of the roles
of lawyers in problem-solving courts. Notice first the changes in the
Model Rules themselves. As Professor Anita Bernstein has written, the
ABA’s 1980 Model Code of Professional Responsibility “omitted zeal
from its enforceable rules, replacing the verb phrase ‘shall represent’
with ‘should represent’—its Canon 7 read ‘A Lawyer Should Represent
a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law’ —thereby signaling
mere guidance rather than a basis for discipline.”33 States have
followed suit. Arizona struck the phrase “zealous advocacy” from its
rules of professional conduct in 2003: “Last December, the adverb
‘zealously’ was removed and replaced with words demanding that
lawyers ‘conduct themselves honorably.’ As the state bar put it, the
change was made because ‘lawyers had misused’ zealous advocacy ‘to
justify unprofessional, intemperate, and uncivil conduct while
engaging in the practice of law.’”34 In 2004, the Colorado Bar
Association President wrote to his membership that: “Diligence,
competence, confidentially, with no conflicts of interest: elegant
simplicity. The rules are comprehensive, describing a lawyer’s duties
not only to clients, but also to others. In short, the word ‘zealous’ is
not a word needed to describe a lawyer’s ethical duties.”35 In 2009, New
York amended its rules, removing all references to zeal.36 In problemsolving courts, as has been explored elsewhere in the literature, lawyers
may be seen to have greater duties to the community and to abstract
notions of justice than to the client,37 although some assert that the

32

Simon, supra note 17.
Anita Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV 1165, 1167 (2006) (citation
omitted).
34
Lincoln Caplan, The Good Advocate, LEGAL AFFAIRS (May/June 2004),
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/May-June-2004/editorial_mayjun04.msp.
35
Steve C. Briggs, The Myth and Mischief of Zealous Advocacy, THE COLO. LAW.
(2004), available at http://coloradomentoring.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/
10/Briggs-S-The-Myth-and-Mischief-of-Zealous-Advocacy-34-The-Colorado-Lawyer-332005.pdf.
36
Vilardo & Doyle, supra note 15, at 56.
37
For an interesting conversation about this debate, see John Feinblatt & Derek
Denckla, What Does It Mean to be a Good Lawyer? Prosecutors, Defenders and Problem-Solving
Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 206 (2001). See also Tamar Meekins, Risky Business: Criminal
Specialty Courts and the Ethical Obligations of the Zealous Criminal Defender, 12 BERKELEY J.
CRIM. L. 75 (2007).
33
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conflict in duties is overstated.38
The diminution of zeal in the rules seems to reflect a conflation
of zeal with incivility, rudeness and utterly unethical behavior—none
of which is actually a problem of zeal. Professor Bernstein defines zeal
as “commitment to one side (rather than to a neutral search for truth),
and passion.”39 She identifies the many flaws misattributed to zeal.40
One example of such misattribution, using her definition of zeal,
comes from a chapter devoted to “Excessive Zeal” in Richard Abel’s
excellent LAWYERS IN THE DOCK, a rich set of case studies on unethical
practices in a variety of settings.41 Abel highlights vivid examples of
behaviors explicitly in violation of the Model Rules, including rude,
personal attacks by lawyers, and falsification of evidence by lawyers. All
of the examples noted are problematic, but problematic on their own
terms as rule violations, not as examples of zeal itself.42 One can be a
passionate advocate committed to one side in a dispute without
engaging in fraudulent, criminal, or hostile behavior. As Professor
Bernstein writes, “Lawyers who err deserve blame; zeal does not.”43
In the immigration context, one appeal of litigation fairness is
how it sweeps the rug from under the feet of lawyers who will falsify
evidence or file anything for the sake of delaying a client’s case, who
rely on an unreasonable zealousness (not the “reasonable” aspect of a
just cause) to shill for clients. Clearly these lawyers are unethical by
any standard, but they try to hide their actions under the cloak of
zealousness, and a different emphasis on duties to the court system
would take that cloak from them.44 More significantly, a litigation
fairness approach lives up to the neglected spirit of Matter of S-M-J-,45 a
pivotal case in asylum jurisprudence that is the closest immigration law
has come to articulating a collaborative approach in the immigration
court system. Notably, however, S-M-J- urged that the collaborative
38

Julie Goldman, The Need for Mental Health Courts for Lawyers to Fulfill Their Duties
Under ABA Model Rule 1.14, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 683, 689–90 (2013); Ben
Kempinen, Problem-Solving Courts and the Defense Function: The Wisconsin Experience, 62
HASTINGS L.J. 1349 (2011).
39
Bernstein, supra note 33, at 1171.
40
Id. at 1175–78.
41
RICHARD ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK: LEARNING FROM ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY
PROCEEDINGS (2008), Chapters 7 and 8.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 1169.
44
Aristotle himself provides a simple response to this argument, noting that “[a]
man can confer the greatest of benefits by a right use of [things that are most useful],
and inflict the greatest of injuries by using them wrongly.” ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC (W.
Rhys Roberts trans.), bk 1, ch. 1, sec. 13, at 3.
45
21 I. & N. Dec. 722 (B.I.A. 1997).
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spirit between judge, Government counsel and the immigrant/
immigrant’s attorney be to the benefit of the immigrant, not the system
itself, in recognition of the tremendous consequences at stake.46 Such
collaboration is sometimes present in pro se cases where judges or
Government counsel will point out the immigrant’s potential eligibility
for some form of relief, and urge the immigrant to find counsel who
can help him or her apply for relief. Once counsel enters an
appearance for the immigrant, however, that notion of collaboration
typically evaporates and the proceedings are often highly contested,
with even judges playing an active role in adversarial questioning of the
immigrant.47 With such adversariality comes the occasion for zealous
advocacy.
2. Zealous Advocacy
Zealous advocacy draws from a longstanding tradition in legal
ethics. In 1908, the ABA discussed “the lawyer’s obligation to give
‘entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of [the
lawyer’s] utmost learning and ability.’”48 This was the “rhetorical
apogee” of zealous advocacy, which has been more recently subsumed
under the rule exhorting attorney diligence,49 with a separate mention
in the preamble to the Model Rules.50 Nonetheless, it continues on as
a popular ideal.
In modern-day practice, the leading voices for zealous advocacy
have been criminal defenders, with abundant scholarship providing
justifications for that position.51 The criminal justice system provides a
rich body of accumulated wisdom regarding zealous advocacy in the
context of appointed counsel.52 The ethical norms of criminal
46

Id. at 727.
Maria Baldini-Potermin, Preparation of Testimony of Noncitizen and Other Lay
Witnesses, IMMIGRATION TRIAL HANDBOOK § 6:17 (2014).
48
MONROE FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 79 (2d ed.
2002) (quoting ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 15 (1908)).
49
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (1983) (“A lawyer must also act
with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy
upon the client’s behalf. A lawyer is not bound, however, to press for every advantage
that might be realized for a client.”).
50
“As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of
the adversary system.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble, at ¶ 2 (2013).
51
FREEDMAN and SMITH, supra note 48; SMITH, infra note 55
52
The NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) has written extensively on this issue in
the South. The LDF noted that “[o]n the eve of Gideon’s 40th anniversary, these
paper guarantees, however, are functionally meaningless in Mississippi, a state which
provides almost no regulation, oversight, or funding for indigent defense.” NAACP
LDF, ASSEMBLY LINE JUSTICE: MISSISSIPPI’S INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS (Feb. 2003),
47
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defenders suggest that among the sometimes competing roles that
lawyers play as advocates and officers of the court, the role as advocate
is particularly important. Indeed, the first of thirty-eight guidelines
issued by the National Legal Aid and Defendant Association
(“NLADA”) states that: “The paramount obligation of criminal defense
counsel is to provide zealous and quality representation to their clients
at all stages of the criminal process. Attorneys also have an obligation
to abide by ethical norms and act in accordance with the rules of the
court.”53 David Luban shows how the power differential between the
defendant and the opposing party—the State—demands heightened
attention to the client, an argument set forth in more detail in the next
section. This Article will show that the same, and more, can be said of
immigration proceedings.
While the reality in criminal courts across the country is far from
the ideal envisioned by Gideon,54 as described in Part III.A, infra, the
zealous defender remains a dominant paradigm. Freedman and
Smith, criminal defense lawyers and scholars, have written extensively
on the primacy of zealous advocacy in a defender’s practice, and Smith
provides an eloquent summary of the philosophy:
[A] lawyering paradigm in which zealous advocacy and the
maintenance of client confidence and trust are paramount.
Simply put, zeal and confidentiality trump most other rules,
principles, or values. When there is tension between these
“fundamental principles” and other ethical rules, criminal
defense lawyers must uphold the principles, even in the face
of public or professional outcry. Although a defender must
act within the bounds of the law, he or she should engage in
advocacy that is as close to the line as possible, and, indeed,
should test the line, if it is in the client’s interest in doing so.55
Freedman and Smith have been among the most significant
proponents of the importance of zealous advocacy for the practice of
criminal defense, although they draw upon the longer tradition of
zealous advocacy throughout the broader legal profession.56 Their
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/
downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/ms_assemblylinejustice.authcheckdam.pdf.
53
NATIONAL LEGAL AID DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES,
available at http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_Standards/Performance_
Guidelines#oneone (last visited Feb. 28, 2015) (emphasis added) [hereinafter NLADA
Standards].
54
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
55
Abbe Smith, The Difference in Criminal Defense and the Difference It Makes, 11 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 83, 89–91 (2003).
56
Lord Brougham famously described this principle in 1838 as follows:
An advocate, by the sacred duty which he owes his client, knows, in the

KEYES (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

4/12/2015 9:27 PM

ZEALOUS ADVOCACY

491

arguments are grounded in the particular needs of criminal defense,
given that in the criminal justice system, individuals are seeking
protection from the full weight of the State—and given the stakes
involved, where life and liberty are on the line.57 For them, “the central
concern of a system of lawyers’ ethics is to strengthen and protect the
role of the lawyer in enhancing individual dignity and autonomy
through advocacy.”58 This view of zealous advocacy does more than
defend the constitutional rights of the accused in any given case; it also
promotes the broader societal goods of dignity and autonomy.
With such strong historical antecedents, Smith and Freedman
have not developed a new principle so much as justified the ongoing
relevance and primacy of an old principle. As any practitioner quickly
realizes, rules of ethics often conflict with one another (even within
one jurisdiction, let alone across jurisdictions), and the Freedman view
is that in situations of conflict, the defender must resolve the conflict
in favor of zealous advocacy for the client.59 Clinical legal scholars
across many disciplines have also recognized zeal as a component of
client-centered lawyering, the “predominant model for teaching
lawyering skills” in American law schools (although problematically in
tension with other values of client-centered lawyering).60
3. Debate Over a Unitary Standard or a Context-Specific
Standard of Practice
Even among proponents of zealousness, extensive debate exists
concerning the question of whether zealous advocacy is justified
uniquely for criminal defense, justified for some broader subset of
legal practice areas, or justified as a standard for all practice areas.
While ultimately beyond the scope of this Article, this question is worth
exploring briefly because this Article at a minimum assumes either that
zealous advocacy is the right unitary standard or, at least, the necessary
standard within the immigration-context.
discharge of that office, but one person in the world, that client and
none other. To save that client by all expedient means—to protect that
client at all hazards and costs to all others, and among others to
himself—is the highest and most unquestioned of his duties; and he
must not regard the alarm—the suffering—the torment—the
destruction—which he may bring upon any other.
1 SPEECHES OF HENRY LORD BROUGHAM 105 (Edinburgh: A. & C. Black, 1838).
57
Monroe H. Freedman, Getting Honest About Client Perjury, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 133 (2008).
58
Smith, supra note 55, at 88.
59
Monroe H. Freedman, Getting Honest About Client Perjury, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 133 (2008).
60
Cruse, supra note 1, at 370.
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At one end of the debate are Simon, discussed above, and Fred
Zacharias, who advance the view that criminal defense is not
particularly exceptional, and therefore should be governed by the
same ethical norms as the rest of the legal profession—and not by
norms of zealous advocacy. Zacharias, whose scholarship focuses on
prosecutorial ethics, has argued that the difference between civil
litigants and criminal defendants is overblown, first because civil cases
can have enormous impact on litigants, and second because
incarceration is often brief and not terribly disruptive to the
incarcerated.61 For these reasons, there is not enough of a difference
between civil and criminal cases, in his view, to justify a different ethical
standard.62
Moving toward a justification for zealous advocacy in certain
contexts is David Luban, a renowned philosopher and legal ethicist
who has also taught in an immigration clinic and written of
immigration’s difficult ethical challenges.63 Where Simon and
Zacharias put forward a unitary theory of ethics that would not justify
criminal defense exceptionalism,64 Luban provides a justification for
treating criminal defense differently.65 Luban’s framework applies
usefully for evaluating the world of immigration, and will therefore be
discussed in greater detail below. He particularly examines the
question of who has the advantages in a criminal prosecution by
looking at resources, procedural advantages, political and
61

Fred C. Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal Distinction in Professional Responsibility, 7 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 165, 177–78 (1996). Smith critiques this article:
He goes so far as to assert that being arrested or incarcerated is no big
deal to most “modern” defendants who “may meet incarcerated friends”
at the local jail, thus, equating jail for the underclass to Starbucks for the
coffee klatsch. Zacharias concludes that, at the very least, “the assertion
that criminal defendants are unique is a vast overgeneralization.”
Smith, supra note 55, at 106–07.
62
Zacharias, supra note 61.
63
David Luban, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 31 (1995).
64
Simon does not believe the power of the State against the individual is a
significant enough factor to justify criminal defense exceptionalism, at least partly
because he is most concerned with lawyers hired by wealthy elites (think: OJ Simpson
defense team) who may have almost limitless resources at their disposal. In Simon’s
view, such lawyers greatly overpower the “small number of harassed, overworked
bureaucrats” who comprise the prosecution. William Simon, The Ethics of Criminal
Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703, 1707 (1993). Smith and Freedman have responded
vigorously to his arguments, questioning, inter alia, whether his theory derives from
the correct understanding of how criminal justice operates, and suggesting that his
more collaborative approach to ethics ignores the reality of the power imbalances
present in trial courts across the nation. SMITH & FREEDMAN, supra note 48.
65
David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1993).
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psychological advantages, and bargaining power, and concludes that
for the overwhelming majority of criminal prosecutions (and not
including the high-price defense that preoccupies Simon), the state
has far more power, which justifies a “rebuttable presumption” of
zealous advocacy: the defender should assume that zealous advocacy is
appropriate, unless something in the specific situation argues
otherwise.66 He writes:
[T]here are substantial objections to a double standard in
legal ethics, including the obvious objection that
practitioners may disagree about which standard applies to
them. In that case, my conclusion is that, if the standard is
to be single, it should be the single standard of permitting
aggressive defense in every case, rather than Simon’s single
standard of presuming that aggressive defense is improper
except when the threats of overpunishment, racism, or
assembly line justice are imminent. After all, since these are
the most typical cases, the exception threatens in any event
to swallow up the presumption.67
A possible line between civil and criminal theories of ethics runs
throughout legal history and ethics scholarship.68 Zealous advocacy is
often treated as so innate to criminal defense that it needs no
particular justification, and is just a distraction to the more
complicated questions of zealousness in non-criminal law practice.69
Abbe Smith has pushed back against the silo-ing of zeal to the
world of criminal defense, arguing that zealous advocacy is the
necessary, defining mode of lawyering across the profession—and not
exceptional to criminal defense.70 Smith acknowledges how criminal
defense is unique, but notes that there is simply no line that can be
meaningfully drawn between it and the rest of the legal profession:

66

Id. at 1757–58.
Id. at 1766.
68
“Many of the core ideals are the same in both contexts, but a lawyer’s duties
may vary depending on whether the litigation is civil or criminal. In my discussion of
the historical standards, I occasionally note the different context of criminal cases
where that difference helped define the duty on the civil side.” Andrews, supra note
14, at 385. The 1814 Swiss oath that otherwise falls squarely under the “litigation
fairness” model, emphasizing both duties to the court and the justness of the cause,
itself carved out an exception for criminal defense: “To not counsel or maintain any
cause that I do not feel is just or equitable, as long as it does not refer to a criminal
defense.” Andrews, supra note 14, at 400.
69
See, e.g., John S. Dzienkowski, Ethical Decision-Making and the Design of Rules of
Ethics, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 55, 75 (2013) (“Of course, in criminal cases, the duty of zeal
has an especially important place
70
Smith, supra note 55.
67
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Although thoughtful scholars have proposed ethical schemes
with two or more tiers, I believe this is a bad idea and
ultimately a dangerous one. Not only is it impossible to draw
a principled line between criminal and civil practice, but it is
impossible to draw tenable categorical lines at all. There are
also a host of practical difficulties in developing an ethical
scheme that reflects all of the contexts of legal practice. The
danger is to the adversary system itself, and the constitutional
principles underlying it.
The push to curb zealous
representation in civil cases will inevitably jeopardize zealous
representation in criminal cases and the rights of the
accused. As we have seen, the critique of “adversarial excess”
invariably spills over into the criminal system.71
The broader and deeper question of whether zealous advocacy
should be the unitary standard for every form of law practice is beyond
the scope of this Article. In the following section, this Article does
reject the notion that zealous advocacy is never justified. By bringing
the ethical standards of immigration practitioners in line with those of
criminal defenders, this work could support Smith—because it shows
how difficult it truly is to find a meaningful line between criminal and
non-criminal work.72 It could also support Luban because he justifies
zealous advocacy in certain criminal and quasi-criminal contexts,73 and
the analysis below situates immigration practice squarely within the
kind of “quasi-criminal” context he suggests.
B. Justifying Zealous Advocacy for Immigration Practice
Because part of the justification for zealous advocacy is the
unevenness of the adversaries in multiple ways, the immigration
system, too, needs to be evaluated as to that question. Indeed, it
compares in some regards quite easily to the criminal system, but also
exceeds its lopsidedness in other regards.74 In an immigration
proceeding, immigrants face the full power of the Government just as
defendants in criminal trials do, but without even the minimal
protections available in the criminal setting.
“A deportation
proceeding is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in
this country . . . . Consistent with the civil nature of the proceeding,
various protections that apply in the context of a criminal trial do not
71

Id. at 137.
Abbe Smith, The Difference in Criminal Defense and the Difference It Makes, 11 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 83, 89–91 (2003).
73
DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 31 (2007).
74
Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683 (2009); Ingrid V.
Eagly, Gideon’s Migration, 122 YALE L.J. 2282 (2013).
72
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apply in a deportation hearing.”75 As in the criminal justice system, the
stakes in immigration proceedings are extraordinarily high: the
possible outcomes usually affect an individual’s ability to live with his
or her family, to work, and to feel safe. What is being litigated through
the immigration laws, in the words of one commentator, strikes “not at
the trappings of social, economic, or political advantage, but at the
trappings of identity: home, family, community, and self, resulting in
‘loss of both property and life; or all that makes life worth living.’”76
Also as in the criminal system, much of the population in removal
proceedings is incarcerated in detention facilities that are only
nominally “civil” detention facilities.77
These similarities to the criminal system, explored in more depth
below, make it a useful exercise to examine how the justifications for
zealous advocacy in the criminal context may justify zealous advocacy
in immigration as well. In his article, Are Criminal Defenders Different?,
Luban examines the question of who has the advantages in a criminal
prosecution by looking at four factors: resources, procedural
advantages, legitimacy, and bargaining power. He concludes that for
the overwhelming majority of criminal prosecutions, the State’s power
far exceeds that of the defense. For this reason, in most cases zealous
advocacy will be appropriate and should be the default position of the
defender.78 Applying Luban’s four factors in the immigration context,
this Article finds a similarly robust justification for zealousness, making
zealous advocacy the appropriate default principle in immigration
proceedings as well. Indeed, as Professor Susan Carle has pointed out,
the “extreme case” where Luban sees a need for moving toward the
ethical edges is actually not the extreme for lawyers who routinely

75

INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984).
Susan Pilcher, Justice Without a Blindfold, 50 ARK. L. REV. 269, 270 (1997)
(quoting Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922)).
77
The harshness of immigration detention, though nominally civil in nature, is
well known. See generally DR. DORA SCHRIRO, DHS IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT: IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2009),
available
at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detentionrpt.pdf (noting how immigration detention facilities resemble criminal facilities, and
how ICE officials are not experts in the delivery of services needed to run such
facilities). For typical accounts of such facilities, see Edwidge Danticat, Detained
Immigrants Deserve Humane Treatment, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2013), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/edwidge-danticat-wasting-money-lives-throughthe-detention-of-immigrants/2013/03/14/3d3e08c4-8b70-11e2-b63f-f53fb9f2fcb4
_story.html; Azadeh N. Shahshahni, The Reality of Life Inside Immigration Detention,
ACLU BLOG (Nov. 20, 2012), https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights-racialjustice/reality-life-inside-immigration-detention.
78
Luban, supra note 67.
76
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practice in such areas.79
1. Resources
The relative power of the state and the immigrant in immigration
removal cases largely shares the power dynamic found in criminal
proceedings. The Migration Policy Institute determined that the
United States Government spends more on immigration enforcement
than all other law enforcement activities combined.80 Much of this
spending is concentrated in border enforcement, including speedy,
mass-trials brought by federal prosecutors for recent border-crossers,
and the spending has not benefited the kind of litigation at the heart
of this Article—litigation in immigration courts in the country’s
interior.81
Although the Office of Principal Legal Advisor within the Bureau
of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which houses the
ICE prosecutors, has not benefited from these budget increases, ICE
still possesses relative advantages in most of the cases in immigration
court. First, ICE has access to the individual’s entire immigration and
criminal history, much of which may not end up being shared with the
applicant. ICE has notes from Customs and Border Patrol, which
could include interviews done at the border, or from USCIS, which
would include asylum interviews notes if the immigrant filed for asylum
affirmatively.82 Under a recent court order, ICE must now provide
these notes if the applicant submits a Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) request. ICE has no affirmative duty to turn over the notes to
counsel or to the applicant, and one scholar suggests this will leave
79

Susan Carle, Structure and Integrity, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1311, 1319–20 (2008)
(asserting that Luban as starting to use a dividing line centered around clients with
power and clients without power).
80
Doris Meissner, et. al., Donald M. Kerwin, Muzaffar Christi, and & Claire
Bergeron, Immigration Enforcement in the United States, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Jan.
2013), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/enforcementpillars.pdf.
81
The President’s Fiscal Year 2015 Budget: Department of Homeland Security,
NATIONAL IMMIGRATION FORUM (Mar. 11, 2014), http://immigrationforum.org/
blog/the-presidents-fiscal-year-2015-budget-department-of-homeland-security/
(showing that the Office of Principal Legal Advisor prosecuting cases in court had a
budget of roughly $204.5 million in 2014, out of an enforcement budget of
approximately $5.6 billion) (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). Note that for FY2016, ICE is
seeking a budget increase to fund approximately 300 more attorney positions. Dibya
Sarkar, The President’s 2016 Budget Request: Immigration and Customs Enforcement, FIERCE
HOMELAND SECURITY (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.fiercehomelandsecurity.com/
story/presidents-2016-budget-request-immigration-and-customs-enforcement/201502-05.
82
Maria Baldini-Potermin, IMMIGRATION TRIAL HANDBOOK, § 3:12. FOIA requests
to the EOIR and DHS.
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many out from receiving these crucial notes as a result.83 Second, ICE
prosecutors typically hear all their scheduling matters in one
consolidated session in front of one judge, while an individual attorney
may have matters on multiple days of the week, requiring hours to be
spent in court simply awaiting a ten minute status hearing.84 Third,
ICE has the capability of investigating documents, courtesy of the
Homeland Security Investigations Forensic Document Laboratory
(“FDL”).85 The FDL has “[m]ore than 60 specially trained staff
members [who] have access to a library and databases of identity and
travel documents from across the world and the latest technology to
identify inconsistencies.”86 By contrast, an immigrant can attest to the
validity of a passport or birth certificate or political membership card
introduced into evidence, but cannot usually independently provide
proof of authentication. Although that may be sufficient to meet their
burden of authentication,87 it hardly carries the same level of weight as
documentation submitted to the FDL.
In the specific realm of asylum litigation, the balance of
investigatory resources is more sharply tilted toward the Government,
for the simple reason that as a matter of safety, asylum-seekers often
fear obtaining evidence from the persecuting country,88 and may fear
83

E-mail from Professor Phil Schrag, one of the authors of the influential REFUGEE
ROULETTE, to the CAIR Coalition (Nov. 22, 2013) (on file with author):
By its literal terms, the consent agreement only applies to officers
handling FOIA requests. That will help referred asylum applicants who
have representatives many months before their hearings. But it won’t
help the many others—with no representatives, with incompetent
representatives who don’t file FOIA requests, or who retain
representatives within a few months before their court hearings—
because they will never get the notes in time.
84
Although not a procedural advantage, the extent of this face time also raises a
“repeat player” issue that may provide ICE with a distinct advantage over the
immigrant’s attorney. Some immigration attorneys are frequently enough at court to
be considered repeat players but none has the extensive time logged in front of
particular judges that ICE counsel would. This may, of course, work to the
disadvantage of an ICE attorney if that attorney has established a bad reputation with
a particular judge.
85
Homeland Security Investigations Forensic Laboratory, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/hsi-fl/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
86
TOP STORY: ICE’s Forensic Document Lab Serves as Authentication Authority,
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Aug. 15, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/
news/releases/1108/110815washingtondc.htm.
87
Documents may be considered authentic where they are inherently reliable.
Matter of Barcenas, 19 I. & N. Dec. 609 (B.I.A. 1988).
88
One attorney known to the author used to seek authentication until a client’s
sister was killed in Burundi in the attempt to authenticate a document. The difficulties
of seeking such authentication were examined—and found plausible—by the Fourth
Circuit in a case about discretion in asylum proceedings. Zuh v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d
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any action—like authentication, or contacting witnesses—that might
alert the persecuting government to the fact that the individual is
seeking asylum.
The availability of the Homeland Security
Investigations Forensic Document Laboratory is an extra advantage in
this delicate setting. More profoundly, as will be discussed below
under procedural advantages, the evidentiary imbalance is aggravated
by the burden on the applicant to provide all corroborating evidence
that would be reasonable to obtain, while the Government can win its
case without producing any evidence whatsoever—simply by finding
discrepancies in the asylum-seeker’s statements.89 The demands on the
Government are simply smaller than the demands on the applicant,
which means that far more resources must go into preparing an
asylum-seeker’s case than would go into opposing it.90
2. Procedural advantages
When considering procedures, it is clear that here the advantages
available to the Government greatly outweigh—and perhaps
completely obliterate—those available to immigration lawyers, in
numerous ways. This section examines how constitutional infirmities
in immigration law advantage the Government, and how the posture
of immigration cases (where the immigrant is seeking a benefit from
the State) disadvantages the immigrant.
a. Constitutional infirmities in immigration law
One set of constitutional infirmities in immigration law arises
from the plenary power doctrine, which permits the political branches
of government to create and administer immigration policy largely
free of constitutional scrutiny.91 While the criminal system has a host
of constitutional protections (even if many are weakly implemented),

504, 508–09 (2008).
89
See Part II.B.2(b), infra.
90
Private immigration attorneys practicing in the area of removal defense earn
approximately $63,000 as a median salary (compared to $100,000 for their colleagues
who do business immigration, and work approximately 50 hours per week (the median
weekly hours)). AILA Marketplace Study, at 44, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION (Dec. 2011), available at http://www.aila.org/content/fileviewer.
aspx?docid=36823&linkid=245426. Fifty-two percent say they have all the work they
can handle and another 21 percent have more than they can handle. Id. at 36. By
comparison, a position posted in 2014 for an ICE attorneys opening listed a salary of
$106,263–$157,100. See USAJOBS, Job Announcement, https://www.usajobs.gov/
GetJob/PrintPreview/385875000# (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (job announcement on
file with author).
91
See generally Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990).
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immigration courts are required only to be “fundamentally fair” under
the Fifth Amendment.92
The fundamental fairness standard, governed by the Mathews v.
Eldridge93 balancing test, allows immigrants to have interpreters,94 and
to present evidence—such as hearsay evidence—that would not be
admissible in federal proceedings.95 The standard, however, also
permits numerous practices that work against the immigrants, and
does not apply in a large number of areas that could be considered
part of fairness, such as having an attorney at all. Consider just four of
these practices. First, under the “fundamental fairness” standard, an
individual need not be physically present for their hearing.96 Detained
immigrants need to be present only by video for their removal
hearings, because transporting them from detention facilities would,
it is argued, be cost-prohibitive for the Government.97 Second, in
immigration proceedings, a mentally incompetent individual’s case
can go forward so long as the proceeding is simply “fair,” although
courts have recognized that this likely means the appointment of
counsel.98 By contrast, in the criminal setting, cases cannot go forward
at all where the defendant is not mentally competent.99 Third, the
92

Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation
of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH & LEE L. REV. 469, 515–16 (2007).
93
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
94
Niarchos v. INS, 393 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1968) (“We think that the absence
of an interpreter at the 1962 hearing is contrary to the aim of our law to provide
fundamental fairness in administrative proceedings.”). Notions of fairness clearly shift
over time, as the current standard providing for interpreters is based upon
fundamental fairness, as was a seminal case reaching the opposite result in 1891.
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) (finding that lack of an
interpreter for a Japanese woman did not violate due process).
95
Matter of Grijalva, 19 I. & N. Dec. 713 (B.I.A. 1988) (hearsay evidence permitted
unless its use would be fundamentally unfair).
96
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(3) (2006) (“If it is impracticable by reason of an alien’s
mental incompetency for the alien to be present at the proceeding, the Attorney
General shall prescribe safeguards to protect the rights and privileges of the alien.”).
97
This practice could be litigated, as the balancing test has strong compelling
factors on the immigrant’s side as well. However, as a practical matter, an interlocutory
appeal on such a pre-trial issue would be made unlikely by the fact of the immigrant’s
detention, as a delay of even two or three months and continued detention while the
matter was pending before the BIA, would considerably deter most immigrants from
filing the appeal.
98
Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474 (B.I.A. 2011).
99
Caleb Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Detention of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA.
L. REV. 832, 834 (1960) (“The competency rule did not evolve from philosophical
notions of punishability, but rather has deep roots in the common law as a by-product
of the ban against trials in absentia; the mentally incompetent defendant, though
physically present in the courtroom, is in reality afforded no opportunity to defend
himself.”) Id. at 834.
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right to be represented at the immigrant’s own expense is available
only as a statutory matter, not from a constitutional right.100 Although
decades of immigration decisions recognized that the immigrants can
expect their counsel to be effective (under the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause),101 that right applies only if they have counsel, and there
is no right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment for immigration
proceedings.102 Furthermore, the recent Compean decision, later
vacated by the Attorney General, found that there was no Fifth
Amendment right to counsel, and therefore no right to effective
counsel.103 Although vacated, the issue is not settled—the Attorney
General asked EOIR to develop a rule on the subject when he vacated
Compean, and EOIR has not yet done so.104
Whether or not immigrants with counsel are entitled to effective
counsel, what is yet more significant is that immigrants largely have no
constitutional right to counsel in the first place. As long established,
removal proceedings are not punishment, no matter how serious a
consequence deportation may be. As the Court noted in Padilla, “We
have long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe ‘penalty’;
100

INA § 240(b)(4)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2013).
For example, in Matter of Assaad, 23 I. & N. Dec. 553, 558 (B.I.A. 2003)
(citations omitted), the court stated:
[S]ince Matter of Lozada was decided 15 years ago, the circuit courts have
consistently continued to recognize that . . . [an alien] has a Fifth
Amendment due process right to a fair immigration hearing and may be
denied that right if counsel prevents the respondent from meaningfully
presenting his or her case.
Id. Matter of Lozada requires that individuals file a complaint with the attorney’s bar
and if able to demonstrate prejudice, they may have their cases reopened or reviewed.
It is unclear how much of a deterrent this system is to immigration practitioners.
102
Trench v. INS, 783 F.2d 181, 183 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 961
(1986). See generally Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and
Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1775–80 (2010).
103
Matter of Compean, 24 I & N. Dec. 710 (B.I.A. 2009). The Ninth Circuit has
found that fundamental fairness does matter, looking at “whether the proceeding is
so fundamentally unfair that the alien is prevented from reasonably presenting her
case,” and requiring the individual to demonstrate prejudice, a high bar to meet.
Torres-Chavez v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Lara-Torres v.
Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 974 (9th Cir. 2004), amended sub nom. Lara-Torres v. Gonzales,
404 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2005)). Steven Legomsky has thoughtfully explored how this
leaves adjudicators unconstrained in assessing effectiveness, and potentially subject to
severe new limitations by Congress, and crafted an approach to require greater
constitutional protections for immigrants post-Padilla. Stephen H. Legomsky,
Transporting Padilla to Deportation Proceedings: A Due Process Right to the Effectiveness of
Counsel, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 43, 47 (2011).
104
Attorney General Vacates Compean Order, Initiates New Rulemaking to Govern
Immigration Removal Proceedings, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 3, 2009), http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-vacates-compean-order-initiates-newrulemaking-govern-immigration-removal.
101
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but it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction.”105 In these noncriminal proceedings, immigrants are not generally entitled to
appointed counsel.106 This sets in motion, as Professor Noferi has
termed it, “cascading constitutional deprivations” for the immigrant.107
Another right available to criminal defendants that is not available
to immigrants is that of Brady disclosures.108 Brady entitles defendants
to see the evidence against them, including potentially exculpatory
evidence.109 In immigration court, pre-trial discovery is nominally
available as a regulatory matter, but in practice does not exist.110 ICE
prosecutors have routinely refused requests to see the immigrant’s “A
file,” or immigration file; the Ninth Circuit held in 2013 that the
immigrant had a right to the file,111 but other circuits have not yet
followed suit. A recent lawsuit has improved the availability of notes
from asylum interviews, but such notes must be requested through
FOIA and not automatically turned over by the Government. Since
the credibility of the immigrant in court is always important, and in
asylum cases particularly critical, this inability to see the file and
discover potential discrepancies before trial matters profoundly.
Where discrepancies are probable (traumatized individuals testifying
about events that may have occurred years in the past)112 and
determinative (an adverse credibility finding jeopardizes asylum
cases), immigrants are at a significant procedural disadvantage not
being able to examine their file before a hearing.
Another constitutional infirmity is the reach of I.N.S. v. LopezMendoza,113 the case that limited the “fruit of the poisonous tree”
doctrine in immigration proceedings. In Lopez-Mendoza, the Court
105

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893)).
106
As noted above, this is being incrementally addressed through appointment of
counsel for specific sub-groups of immigrants.
107
Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel
for Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L.
63, 81 (2012).
108
The landmark Brady v. Maryland case found a due process violation where the
prosecution did not turn over potentially exculpatory evidence to defense. 373 U.S.
83 (1963).
109
Id.
110
Geoffrey Heeren, Shaking the One-Way Mirror: Discovery in Immigration Court, 79
BROOK. L. REV. 1569 (2014).
111
Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 373–74 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (noting
that the immigrant has a right to a “full and fair hearing in a deportation proceeding”
under the Fifth Amendment, and holding that denying him access to his immigration
file (“alien file”) constituted a violation of this constitutional right).
112
Ilunga v. Holder, No. 13-2064, 2015 WL 332110 (4th Cir. Jan. 27, 2015).
113
468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
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held that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment
could nonetheless be admissible in immigration court, absent
“particularly egregious” Fourth Amendment violations, because
immigration proceedings are “purely” civil actions where criminal
protections need not apply.114
Immigration practitioners still
sometimes seek to suppress illegally obtained evidence, and
occasionally succeed, but judges are hesitant to engage in Fourth
Amendment litigation in their administrative tribunals, and
practitioners face pressure from both their adversary (ICE) and the
judge him or herself to refrain from raising these issues.
Likewise, secret evidence has been permitted in immigration
court for decades. In Knauff v. Shaughnessy, a case which arose in the
context of national security concerns during the Second World War,
the Government permitted the exclusion of Ellen Knauff on the basis
of secret evidence.115 INA §240(b)(4)(B) also permits the Government
to rely upon secret evidence in the removal context.116 Secret evidence
clearly inhibits immigrants’ ability to defend themselves because they
will typically only receive a summary of the evidence, making it difficult
to contest its accuracy, challenge its sources, and so forth.117
b. Posture of immigration cases
A critical source of difference between the criminal and
immigration court settings arises from the different posture of
immigration cases. In criminal cases, the defendant is seeking
protection from the State. In immigration cases, the immigrant is
seeking protection from the State’s desire to remove him or her, and
the State initially has the burden to prove removability.118 This is a
burden that the State is seldom required to prove. Even when
contested, which happens seldom, the standard of proof for the State
is lower than in the criminal context, which may help explain the
number of U.S. citizens who end up being deported despite their
protestations that they are, indeed, citizens.119
114

Id. at 1050.
U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
116
INA § 240(b)(4)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(c)(3)(iv) (2013). See also INA §
504(e)(1)(A) (creating Alien Terrorist Removal Courts where secret evidence may be
used). But see Jaya Ramji-Nogales, A Global Approach to Secret Evidence: How Human Rights
Law Can Reform Our Immigration System, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 301–02
(noting that this provision has never yet been invoked).
117
Niels W. Frenzen, National Security and Procedural Fairness: Secret Evidence and the
Immigration Laws, 76 INTERPRETER RELEASE 45 (1999).
118
INA § 240(c)(3).
119
William Finnegan, The Deportation Machine, NEW YORKER (Apr. 29, 2013); Ted
115
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Once the State meets this initial burden, usually with the
immigrant conceding removability at a master calendar hearing, the
burden shifts to the immigrant to establish a right to remain and this
generally means that the immigrant must request a benefit from the
State, instead of seeking enforcement of a right.120 This basic tenet of
immigration law creates countless procedural disadvantages and
ethical dilemmas for the immigration practitioner, some of which are
examined in more detail in Part B, infra. At root, because the
immigrant is affirmatively seeking a benefit, almost anything the
Government may require to show eligibility for that benefit must be
given—if the requirement is too onerous, the individual can simply
choose not to apply for the benefit.121
Finally, simply in terms of the task set for each side, the
procedural posture means that the task is vastly more difficult and
resource-intensive for the immigrant’s attorney than for the
Government. First, the attorney must establish every element of
eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence, which means the
Government need simply disprove one element.122 Second, in asylum
cases in particular, the attorney must provide corroborating evidence
of the asylum claim where reasonable to expect that such evidence is
available, despite the relative unlikelihood of someone fleeing
persecution with corroborating documents.123 By contrast, the
Government can win its case merely by finding inconsistencies in the
applicant’s testimony, usually via cross-examination and sometimes by
introducing notes from initial asylum interviews conducted months, if
not years, before the final hearing.124 For reasons well explored
Robbins, In the Rush to Deport, Expelling U.S. Citizens, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 24, 2011).
See also DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND THE NEW AMERICAN
DIASPORA 14–15 (2012).
120
INA § 240(c)(2).
121
Similar issues abound in welfare law, such as requirements that candidates
undergo drug testing before receiving welfare benefits, although some of these laws
are being struck down as unconstitutional. See, e.g., Lebron v. Wilkins, 990 F. Supp. 2d
1280 (M.D. Fla. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Lebron v. Sec’y of Florida Dep’t of Children &
Families, No. 14-10322, 2014 WL 6782734 (11th Cir. Dec. 3, 2014).
122
INA § 240(c)(4).
123
“In most cases a person fleeing from persecution will have arrived with the
barest necessities and very frequently even without personal documents.” UNHCR,
UNHCR HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS
UNDER THE 1951 REFUGEE CONVENTION AND 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS
OF REFUGEES 196, available at http://archive.hrea.org/learn/tutorials/refugees/
Handbook/partii.htm (last visited Feb. 28. 2015).
124
The Fourth Circuit recently acknowledged this unfairness powerfully in Ilunga
v. Holder, No. 13-2064, 2015 WL 332110 (4th Cir. Jan. 27, 2015), but advocates still
must contend with the REAL ID’s definition of credibility, which includes consistency.
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elsewhere, even asylum-seekers with truthful, unembellished claims
may be inconsistent, creating another challenge for their lawyers to
overcome.
3. Legitimacy
This aspect of Luban’s justification for zealous advocacy in the
criminal context is the most weakly applied to the immigration
context, but has resonance here, too. Writing about jury impressions
of the State’s criminal case, he notes the narrative and normative
power that the State has in pursuing a case against a defendant, as
juries will think “where there’s smoke, there’s fire.”125
The
Government’s reliance on police officers as witnesses, too, taps into
powerful perceptions about law enforcement reliability, and who
constitute the “good guys” in a particular case. The jurors’ faith that a
case brought by the State is credible because the State itself is
“democratic and legitimate” also strengthens the State’s hand at trial,
in his view.
Immigration hearings are bench trials, so if this factor of
legitimacy resonates in the immigration context, it is through the
susceptibility of judges to those narrative dynamics.126 Those dynamics
may, indeed, be powerful, as I have explored in other scholarship.127
The dynamics emerge through such phenomena such as the
availability heuristic (the mental shortcut filling in dispositive
information when the fact-finder has a litany of available stories, often
from popular media, that help make sense of the case in front of him
or her) or cognitive dissonance (the difficulty of reconciling new
information with previously understood information or, even more
powerfully, previously made decisions).128 But while legitimacy aspect
may be a factor, it is likely less of a factor here than in the criminal jurytrial context, where most judges are also keenly aware of their duty to
rule impartially—a factor that may help diminish the biases and
heuristics noted above, at least as compared to juries.

See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–13, 119 Stat. 231; 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252 (West
2015).
125
Luban, supra note 65 at 1741.
126
See generally Elizabeth Keyes, Beyond Saints and Sinners: Discretion and the Need for
New Narratives in the U.S. Immigration System, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207 (2012).
127
Id.
128
Id.
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Bargaining power

Luban posits that the weak bargaining power of criminal
defendants can justify zealous advocacy, because such advocacy may be
the only true bargaining chip that a criminal defender has.129 The same
can be said for immigration attorneys. Many immigrants are in
removal proceedings because of some prior contact with the criminal
justice system.130 The conflation of the immigration and criminal
systems, and the consequences to immigrants’ removability, have been
well studied in both criminal and immigration scholarship.131 An
immigrant’s bargaining power within immigration has often been
eliminated at that stage of proceedings, where he or she accepted a
guilty plea that rendered him or her deportable, yielding to complex
pressures that have been well documented elsewhere.132
Within the immigration system itself, bargaining power is
extremely limited. Other scholars have noted, correctly, that this stems
from the binary nature of removal proceedings, where the outcomes
are either removal or admission.133 What little opportunity exists for
negotiation focuses on two specific avenues: seeking prosecutorial
discretion to administratively close or terminate a case (or stay removal
if ordered removed) or by requesting voluntary departure in lieu of a
removal order.134 As described here, the immigrant has extraordinarily
129

Luban, supra note 65 at 1747 (“In the criminal defense context, by contrast, it
seems intuitively correct to me that the prospect of aggressive defense can indeed
function to take away the prosecutor’s built-in bargaining advantage . . . and it seems
plain that prosecutors have little incentive to bargain fairly unless defenders
reestablish the balance of bargaining power.”)
130
See Jason A. Cade, The Plea Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 1751 (2013).
131
Jason A. Cade and Jenny Roberts have explored this intersection from the
criminal justice perspective. See Jason A. Cade, The Plea Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in
Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1751 (2013); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors
Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277
(2011). Many have explored this intersection on the immigration side, since the early
work of Juliet Stumpf and Jennifer Chacón. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders:
Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1831
(2007); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power,
56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006).
132
Cade, supra note 131; Roberts, supra note 131.
133
See, e.g., Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683 (2009)
(calling for proportionate immigration sanctions in lieu of the one currently available
sanction, deportation); Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 341, 393 (2008) (“[T]here is little bargaining in modern deportation
proceedings, relative to the bargaining that occurs in the criminal justice system,
because deportation is a largely binary rather than graduated sanction.”).
134
A third, specific to the asylum context, concerns offers by the government to
stipulate to withholding of removal (a higher evidentiary burden, but a lesser form of
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little bargaining power in requests for prosecutorial discretion, and the
more effective requests for voluntary departure actually yield little by
way of benefit to the immigrant—thus, they are bargains easily given
by the Government and not reflective of a diminished governmental
bargaining power.
One of the broadest means available to securing relief from
removal is the favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion, but as the
name implies, it is relief that is solely determined by the prosecutor
himself. Although having a long history in the immigration context,135
prosecutorial discretion came to prominence among immigration
practitioners with the release of two memos by ICE Director John
Morton in the summer of 2011.136 These two memos were followed by
an announcement that the new agency vision would be implemented
in conjunction with the Department of Justice through an
individualized review of existing cases to permit closure or other
discretionary actions for those deemed to be low priorities.137 ThenSecretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano explained the
administration’s policy in a speech given on October 5, 2011,
emphasizing that the Administration’s stated focus had been clearing
immigration courts’ dockets so that priority could be given to the
“identification and removal of public safety and national security
threats.”138
Despite the attention given to it, however, and despite the breadth
permitted by the Morton Memos, actual favorable exercises of
discretion have been extremely limited. There is little cost to the
relief) in lieu of litigating and risking an adverse decision from the judge. The
difficulties associated with this particular bargaining position merit far more detailed
consideration than this Article can afford.
135
See generally Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, In Defense of DACA, Deferred Action and the
DREAM Act, 91 TEX. L. REV. 59 (2013).
136
The first memo concerned civil immigration priorities generally. MEMORANDUM
FROM JOHN MORTON ON EXERCISING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION CONSISTENT WITH THE
CIVIL IMMIGRATION PRIORITIES OF THE AGENCY FOR THE APPREHENSION, DETENTION, AND
REMOVAL OF ALIENS (June 17, 2011), www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/
prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf. The second concerned discretion for particular
victims, witnesses and plaintiffs. MEMORANDUM FROM JOHN MORTON ON PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION REGARDING CERTAIN VICTIMS, WITNESSES AND PLAINTIFFS (June 17, 2011),
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/ domestic-violence.pdf.
137
Letter from Janet Napolitano to Senator Dick Durbin (Aug. 18, 2011), available
at http://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/Prosecutorial
%20Discretion_Napolitano%20Durbin%20letter%208-18-11.pdf (last visited Mar. 30,
2015).
138
DHS, Press Release, Secretary Napolitano’s Remarks on Smart Effective Border Security
and Immigration Enforcement, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY (Oct. 5, 2011),
http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/speeches/20111005-napolitano-remarks-border-strategyand-immigration-enforcement.shtm.
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Government for denying a prosecutorial discretion request, especially
where the prosecutor could point to any negative equity. Although
there are supposed to be systemic advantages to granting the requests
where the applicant meets enough of the prosecutorial discretion
factors, there is little advantage to the prosecutor in any particular case.
The prosecutor bears the risk of being the name associated with a
decision not to remove someone who later proved dangerous, either
in terms of national security or crimes—and while that risk may be
small, the impact would be strongly negative if it did happen. With the
outcomes in the hands of the prosecutors, and incentives skewed
toward denying requests, it is unsurprising that the rate of favorable
prosecutorial discretion decisions remains low. The latest data, from
December 2014, showed that only 6.6 percent of cases before the
immigration courts were closed through an exercise of prosecutorial
discretion.139 An earlier report indicated that 95 percent of those
granted prosecutorial discretion were represented by attorneys, so
even with advocates, the vast majority of immigrants were unable to
bargain for the desired result of administrative closure or termination
of their cases.140
The second form of negotiation that happens in immigration
court, voluntary departure, is the reverse of prosecutorial discretion in
terms of incentives and availability. Voluntary departure is designated
by statute to permit certain immigrants to avoid the ten-year bar
associated with an immigration court removal order and “voluntarily
depart” the country at their own expense.141 Voluntary departure
meets multiple government objectives: removing the unlawful
immigrant, avoiding litigation, and saving the money it would take to
litigate and enforce an order, as well as to actually transport the
immigrant to the home country.142 Absent any of the statutory bars to
voluntary departure, such as certain criminal convictions,143 ICE
prosecutors routinely agree to requests for voluntary departure.

139

TRAC Immigration, Immigration Court Cases Closed Based on Prosecutorial
Discretion, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/prosdiscretion/compbacklog_latest.html
(last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
140
TRAC Immigration, ICE Prosecutorial Discretion Program (June 28, 2012),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/287/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
141
INA § 240B (2013).
142
Ballenilla-Gonzalez v. INS, 546 F.2d 515, 521 (2d Cir. 1976) (“The purpose of
authorizing voluntary departure in lieu of deportation is to effect the alien’s prompt
departure without further trouble to the Service. Both the aliens and the Service
benefit thereby.”).
143
Aggravated felonies disqualify immigrants from seeking voluntary departure.
INA § 240B(a)(1).
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Although this might seem to be an area where the immigrant has
great bargaining power, the fact is that the benefit to the immigrant is
usually negligible—if there is any benefit at all. Immigrants who have
accrued a year or more of unlawful presence in the United States are
subject to a ten-year bar whether they leave the country with an
immigration court removal order, through voluntary departure, or
simply by self-deportation.144 Many of those in immigration removal
proceedings have this ten-year bar already, in one of two ways. Either
they were picked up after having been in the country a year or more,
or for more recent arrivals, their continued accrual of unlawful
presence while awaiting their hearing pushes them past the allimportant year mark. The Government therefore loses nothing, gains
the same ten-year bar on the individual returning, and avoids
litigation. Moreover, the immigrant leaves at his or her own expense—
a specific cost, although one that is perhaps compensated for by the
dignitary value of not being deported. To the extent the immigrant is
bargaining, it is for something of considerable benefit to the
Government, hardly a robust example of bargaining power.
Moreover, detention casts a shadow over any bargaining
processes. Detained immigrants comprised 36 percent of immigration
court cases, or roughly 100,000 people, completed in FY2012.145 Of
these 100,000 cases, some were detained because they were subject to
the mandatory detention provision of the INA, which covers almost all
drug offenses, as well as many theft convictions, violent crimes, and
others.146 Others are detained simply because the government sees
them as a flight risk and/or a danger to public safety, or because they
are unable to pay bond, if bond was set.147 In either situation, very
difficult detention conditions148 create a strong incentive to agree to
any option that will end the detention quickly and provide a strong
144

INA 212 (a)(9)(B)(i)(II).
FY 2012 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK FY 2012, at O1, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 2013,
revised Mar. 2013), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy12syb.pdf [hereinafter
EOIR STATISTICAL YEARBOOK].
146
INA § 236(c).
147
Discretionary detention is authorized by INA § 236(a), and its parameters are
fleshed out in Matter of Patel, 15 I&N Dec. 666 (B.I.A. 1976).
148
See, e.g., Robert Morgenthau, Immigrants Jailed Just to Hit a Number, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS (Jan 19, 2014), available at http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/immigrantsjailed-hit-number-article-1.1583488; Ian Urbina and Catherine Rentz, Immigrants Held
in Solitary Cells, Often for Weeks, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/03/24/us/immigrants-held-in-solitary-cells-often-for-weeks.html?pagewanted
=all&_r=0; Nina Bernstein, Officials Hid Truths of Immigrant Deaths in Jail, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 9, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 2010/01/10/us/10detain
.html?ref=incustodydeaths.
145
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disincentive to exercising rights of appeal, which can stretch a period
of detention out for months longer. Moreover, some immigrants are
unlikely to be ultimately removed because they are from a country
where, for example, there is ongoing strife, and these individuals
become eligible for post-order release (usually with intensive
monitoring and/or an ankle bracelet) 180 days after an
administratively final order.149 An appeal would delay their possibility
of release on that basis as well, as it would delay the existence of an
administratively final order. Finally, detainees have great difficulty
securing representation for possible appeals, often because of the
increased cost of access to detention facilities by lawyers (distance and
bureaucratic obstacles, as well as higher costs for hiring experts who
might be needed in the case).150
These dramatic limitations on the existence of immigrants’
bargaining power justify zealous advocacy. As Luban writes in the
criminal context, “[t]he credible threat of an aggressive defense that
will not necessarily lead to acquittal—remember that only 1% of state
felony prosecutions end in acquittal—may provide a bargaining chip
sufficient to persuade an otherwise recalcitrant prosecutor to bargain
in good faith.”151 In immigration, knowing that a case will be fiercely
litigated may be sufficient to have the Government attorney take a
closer look at whether, indeed, this case could benefit from
prosecutorial discretion instead of litigation. While Government
attorneys have not fully availed of prosecutorial discretion in line with
the Morton memos,152 the prospect of vigorous litigation, instead of the
likelihood of accepting voluntary departure or facing a weak
opponent, may be enough to add some vitality to the prosecutorial
discretion option.

149

8 C.F.R. § 241.4 (2013).
See generally Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation for Detained Immigrants
Facing Deportation: Varick Street Detention Facility, A Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541,
548 (2009); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOCKED UP FAR AWAY § VII (Dec. 2, 2009),
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/86760/section/8 (describing the phenomenon of
ICE transfers of detainees to remote locations, and the incumbent strains placed on
their attorneys, particularly pro bono attorneys).
151
Luban, supra note 67, at 1745 (citation omitted).
152
As of this writing, there is no data on the superseding Johnson memos.
150
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5. Moral (Il)legitimacy of the Rules Governing
Immigration Lawyers
To all of these factors enumerated by David Luban in the criminal
context, I add a fifth that is unique to immigration law. Lawyers
practicing in immigration court are governed not just by the rules of
the bar(s) where they are admitted, but also by the rules of
immigration court itself, which are set by the Executive Office of
Immigration Review (“EOIR”), the agency within Department of
Justice that administers the immigration courts themselves.153 These
rules apply only to the immigrant’s representative, not to the
Government attorneys for whom separate rules and regulations exist.154
This is not merely a question of authorship, but of interest. Rules
of professional conduct have long been written by lawyers’ associations
to govern themselves: a means of regulating themselves so as to avoid
regulation (and possibly interference) by the Government.155
Although lawyers presumably have strong self-interest in rules that
favor their ability to meet their clients’ needs in any way possible, rules
which were too heavily focused on duties to the client with no
countervailing duties to the court would likely invite criticism and,
eventually, governmental rule-setting. As such, the rules consider a
number of interests, and attempt to balance those interests, with the
result being tensions and ambiguities, but ones that lawyers have for
generations been largely able to navigate.
By contrast, the rules authored by the immigration court system
itself favor the court’s interests in excess of what is in state and model
rules of professional conduct. Several of the rules are analogous to
common rules of professional conduct, but not all. As clinical law
professor and immigration scholar Lauren Gilbert has shown, the
EOIR rules have a significant difference when it comes to the lawyer’s
ability to protect client confidences (explored in Part B). AILA ethicist
Reid Trautz underscores this problem: EOIR rules “have no
153

8 C.F.R. § 1003.102 (2013).
EOIR, FACT SHEET: PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR IMMIGRATION PRACTITIONERS –
RULES AND PROCEDURES (Aug. 19, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/
press/00/profcondfaks.htm.
155
Critiques of this, too, abound. As Patrick J. Schiltz has written:
I don’t have anything against the formal rules. Often, they are all that
stands between an unethical lawyer and a vulnerable client. You should
learn them and follow them. But you should also understand that the
formal rules represent nothing more than “the lowest common
denominator of conduct that a highly self-interested group will tolerate.”
Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy
and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871 (1999) (quoting Deborah L. Rhode,
Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665, 730 (1994)).
154
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counterpart to Rule 1.6—Maintaining Confidentiality. None. The
federal rules are primarily to benefit the agencies, not clients. The
agencies want disclosure. They value and require candor, so they do
not address client confidentiality.”156 James Garvin echoes this, noting
that while the EOIR rules were formulated, among other reasons, with
an imperative of “safeguarding a vulnerable client population,” the
rules—unlike those for states—”do not deal nearly so much with
conduct offensive to individuals as they do with conduct offensive to
the Government.”157 For these and other reasons, immigration
attorneys fiercely critiqued the rules when they were proposed.158
Thus, the EOIR rules of conduct provide another compelling reason
to embrace zealous advocacy: where attorney choices are sharply
circumscribed by rules less legitimate than those adopted by state bar
associations, lawyers should be seeking to push those rules to their
limits to defend the interests of their clients.
III.

WHY ADOPT A GUIDING PRINCIPLE AT ALL?

Although immigrants are not entitled to counsel at the
Government’s expense, when they do secure counsel—and in the
slowly increasing numbers of cases where appointed counsel is
provided—they are, at least for now, entitled to have that counsel be
effective. There is very little guidance, however, as to what constitutes
effective counsel in the immigration context, and in any case, as
discussed above, legally-sufficient effectiveness may differ enormously
from truly effective lawyering. In the absence of guidance, ethical
standards may tend toward the lowest norm permitted under the
applicable rules of professional conduct particularly since many
lawyers will never be held accountable for poor-quality lawyering.159 In
the absence of a well-articulated principle for resolving tensions,
multiple pressures (described in Part Bmake it far more likely that
tensions will resolve in favor of the tribunal and not in favor of any one
particular client. Articulating the principle of zealous advocacy as an
obligation of professional responsibility and lawyerly effectiveness
matters precisely because of all these factors, trends and impulses that
work against it.
156

Reid F. Trautz, When a Client Lies: Balancing Confidentiality and Candor (Dec. 18,
2012), available at http://agora.aila.org/product/detail/1220 (emphasis added) (last
visited Feb. 28, 2015).
157
James G. Garvin, Multi-Jurisdictional Disciplinary Enforcement, in AILA, ETHICS IN
A BRAVE NEW WORLD: PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY, AND
RISK MANAGEMENT FOR IMMIGRATION PRACTITIONERS, AILA (2004) 84.
158
Id., at 83.
159
Discussed supra in Part 5.
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A. The Power of Standard Setting: Lessons from Criminal Defense
Experiences in the criminal context help us see the need for
articulating standards of effectiveness that include zealousness. In the
decades since Gideon v. Wainwright160 established the right indigent
criminal defendants have to a lawyer, the experience of appointed
counsel in the criminal setting has shown us that not all defenders are
equal. An unfortunate percentage of appointed defenders turn in
miserably deficient performances.161 Criticisms abound concerning
the nation’s failure to live up to the promise of Gideon: poor state
funding162 has led to overwhelmingly large dockets for defenders,163
exacerbated by the expanded reach of the criminal justice system in an
era of massive incarceration.164 Compounding these factors is the
laughably limited protection afforded to defendants who believe they
have been inadequately represented and who must satisfy the onerous
ineffective assistance of counsel requirements under Strickland v.
Washington.165 One prominent criminal defense attorney, Steven
Bright, has lamented that the Strickland standard “demeans the Sixth
Amendment” promise of counsel.166 Strickland, famously, allows
representation by “anyone with a ‘warm body and a law degree’ to
satisfy the Sixth Amendment.”167
160

372 U.S. 335 (1963).
See generally Bennett H. Brummer, The Banality of Excessive Defender Workload:
Managing the Systemic Obstruction of Justice, 22 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 104 (2009). See also
Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. State, 115 So.3d 261 (Fl. 2013)
(holding that enormous workloads violated the defendants’ Sixth Amendment right
to counsel); Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 682–83 (2007)
(describing “pervasive” deficiencies in defense). “The result [of enormous caseloads]
is rampant ineffectiveness of trial counsel even among conscientious public defenders,
to say nothing of lawyers who sleep through trial or abuse alcohol and drugs while
representing their clients.” Id. at 83.
162
Thomas Giovanni and Roopal Patel, Gideon at 50: Three Reforms to Revive the Right
CENTER
FOR
JUSTICE
(2013),
available
at
to
Counsel,
BRENNAN
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Gideon_Report_04
0913.pdf.
163
Id.
164
Abbe Smith has described “the increasingly muted sound of Gideon’s Trumpet
as the criminal justice system has grown beyond all imagination.” Abbe Smith, Gideon
Was a Prisoner: On Criminal Defense in a Time of Mass Incarceration, 70 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1363, 1364 (2013) (citation omitted); see also Paul Butler, Gideon’s Muted Trumpet,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2013, at A21.
165
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
166
Steven Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for
the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1883 (1994).
167
Abbe Smith, Gideon Was a Prisoner: On Criminal Defense in a Time of Mass
Incarceration, 70 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1363, 1385 (2013) (quoting David Bazelon, The
Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEO. L.J. 811, 819 (1976). And beyond these
161
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Understandably, just as the effectiveness of the criminal defense
bar ranges widely, so does the level of zealous advocacy. Often,
criminal defendants receive subpar, decidedly un-zealous
representation from appointed counsel. As Bright has written, “Poor
people accused of capital crimes are often defended by lawyers who
lack the skills, resources, and commitment to handle such serious
matters. This fact is confirmed in case after case.”168 This problem has
been documented and critiqued widely.169 As lawyers have tried to put
meaning into the Strickland standard, seeking findings that counsel was
ineffective at the trial level, a pattern of poor representation has
become part of the story of criminal defense.
If Strickland represents one force moving toward substandard
representation, then well-developed principles of zealous advocacy
constitute a force pushing back against Strickland. Thanks to the
exceptional leadership of many defender services and the National
Legal Aid and Defender Association (“NLADA”), robust standards of
competent representation have been developed and the best
defenders provide exceptional service to their clients at defender
services from Washington, D.C. to Seattle to the Bronx. NLADA’s role
articulating and defining the standard for ethical practice of criminal
defense was recognized by the Supreme Court in Padilla. In the
Court’s examination of effectiveness of counsel, the Court emphasized
the “weight of prevailing professional norms,” citing NLADA and
others.170
Among these prevailing norms, zealousness reigns supreme.
According to NLADA, the very first standard that a defender must
meet is this: “The paramount obligation of criminal defense counsel is
to provide zealous and quality representation to their clients at all stages
of the criminal process. Attorneys also have an obligation to abide by
ethical norms and act in accordance with the rules of the court.”171 The
primacy of zealous advocacy here is clear, tempered by other ethical
existing criticisms, some have said that Strickland is diluted still farther by the Padilla
decision, imposing a lesser duty of effectiveness on criminal defenders representing
noncitizens. See generally César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Strickland-Lite: Padilla’s
Two-Tiered Duty for Noncitizens, 72 MD. L. REV. 844 (2013) (criticizing the Court’s failure
to fully remedy the problem of inaccurate advice for noncitizen criminal defendants).
168
Bright, supra note 166, at 1836. But see Butler, supra note 164.
169
EMILY M. WEST, COURT FINDINGS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS
IN POST•CONVICTION APPEALS AMONG THE FIRST 255 DNA EXONERATION CASES,
INNOCENCE PROJECT 3 (2010) (noting that 81 percent of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims were rejected in cases where the defendant was ultimately exonerated
through DNA); Bright, supra note 166.
170
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 367 (2010).
171
NLADA Standards, supra note 53 (emphasis added).
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norms and court-rules. The specificity of the subsequent standards
provides a fuller sense of what zealous advocacy entails: undertaking
every possible motion and action to secure the best outcome for the
client. For example, contrary to the conciliatory legal culture that
exists in many fora, Guideline 5.1 sets the default mode in favor of
filing pretrial motions; such motions should be filed “whenever there
exists a good-faith reason to believe that the applicable law may entitle
the defendant to relief which the court has discretion to grant.” The
same guideline states that “[c]ounsel should withdraw or decide not to
file a motion only after careful consideration.”172
The articulation of these standards matters. Literature on
organizational culture shows that the repeated articulation of values
and norms influences the conduct of cases.173 As scholar Darryl Brown
has written, particularly considering the criminal practice setting, “In
localized, close-knit practice settings, lawyers and judges often adopt
strong social norms. . . . On crucial issues, attorney judgment is
affected by norms that coerce or persuade attorneys to choose options
they would not otherwise choose, for reasons other than the client’s
best interest.”174 He goes on to powerfully describe the ways that local
norms constrain attorneys from filing certain kinds of motions, seeking
jury trials, and so forth, because the consequences of violating the
norms are so costly.175 Other scholars have defined legal culture as the
“bundle of shared, local perceptions and expectations in the operation
of a legal system.”176 This “bundle” may or may not comport with actual
laws and regulations, as Brown writes, but they become a set of “‘rules
of thumb’ that seem to arise spontaneously and supplant the exercise
of discretion in the mass processing of cases.”177 They may be seen as
heuristics, mental short-cuts that help attorneys navigate law that “is
too complex for attorneys to internalize and apply on a daily basis.”178
172

Id. at 5.1(c) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: Report of the
Working Group on Best Practices, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1995–99 (2010) (discussing
systemic and cultural aspects of prosecutorial offices, and how they impact conduct).
174
Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Procedure Entitlements, Professionalism, and Lawyering
Norms, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 801, 803 (2000).
175
Id. at 806–13.
176
Theresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence
of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 801, 803 (1994). See generally Mary Helen McNeal, Slow Down, People
Breathing: Lawyering, Culture, and Place, 18 CLINICAL L. REV. 183, 205–20 (2011)
(discussing the multiple factors that create and sustain local lawyering cultures).
177
Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers’ Heads, 90
NW. U. L. REV. 1498, 1518 (1996).
178
McNeal, supra note 176, at 212.
173
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Legal culture is also powerful in terms of ethics. After studying
the legal culture of Baltimore attorneys, one scholar noted that “no
coherent account of professionalism, legal ethics, or the contemporary
legal profession is possible without understanding the workings of
practice organizations.”179 And unfortunately, culture is not always in
a positive relationship with ethics. Noted ethics scholar Deborah
Rhode has assessed the impact there has been as the legal profession
as shifted from “informal regulatory controls” to “reliance on official
codes.”180 She writes that:
[A]spirational norms have largely given way to minimal rules.
The result does not necessarily reflect what most
commentators (or even lawyers) would consider right or
moral. And the danger in diluting the ethical content of
ethical codes is that they will nonetheless pass for ethics. New
entrants are socialized to the lowest common denominator
of conduct that a highly self-interested group will tolerate.181
If organizational culture and norms affect the practice of law, as
they surely do, then the content of professional norms matters greatly
to the practice of zealous advocacy. The ethos promoted by a
commitment to zealous advocacy creates a cultural counterweight to
prevailing norms of conciliation. Negotiation, mediation, and other
forms of alternative dispute resolution dominate civil justice (and
within civil litigation in particular, some estimate that as many as 99
percent of cases resolve without going to trial).182 In the criminal
justice sphere, the vast majority of cases are negotiated, or pleaded, out
instead of fully litigated.183 This overall tendency toward non-litigation
is compounded by the dynamics of lawyers who are harried and
overworked, and who are, perhaps most problematically, subject to the
“repeat player” dilemma. This dilemma, well known to practitioners,
arises when lawyers appear before the same set of judges, against the
same adversaries, over and over, where relationships and reputation—
not wanting to rock the boat—may inveigh powerfully against
zealousness.184 Against such a context, the principled articulation of
179

Id. at 217 (quoting MICHAEL KELLY, THE LIVES OF LAWYERS 18 (1996))
Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665, 730
(1994).
181
Id.
182
Hilarie Bass, The End of the Justice System as We Knew It?, 36 LITIGATION 1, 1 (2010).
183
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372–73 (2010) (citing statistics from the
Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics). See generally Jenny Roberts, Effective
Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650 (2013) (discussing why a right to effective
counsel in plea-bargaining should be recognized).
184
See, e.g., Mary Helen McNeal, Slow Down, People Breathing: Lawyering, Culture
and Place, 18 CLINICAL L. REV. 183, 216–17 (2011) (discussing the “repeat player”
180
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and commitment to zealous advocacy as a guiding principle makes it
possible to be zealous and for those repeat players to understand that
the zealousness is the defender doing her or his job.
NLADA and leading defender services provide the counterpoint
in an era when there are “too few resources, too many clients, and fee
systems that discourage zealous advocacy.”185 At their best, these
organizations deliver client-centered lawyering that—whether the
client wins, loses or something in-between—helps create procedural
justice. Procedural justice sees value in zealous representation where
it leaves a client trusting (relatively) the fairness of the process,
regardless of the actual result. Moreover, the articulation of the
standard may provide necessary support and encouragement to those
advocating fiercely for their clients. As Abbe Smith has written:
The ethic of zeal is especially important here because it is
comfortingly simple. How else might would-be defenders be
assured that they will be able to do the work and sleep at
night, and even feel good about it? The paradigm of
devotion and zeal serves as both the motivation for doing the
work and the excuse for doing it well.186
Robust assertion of ethical standards and precise definitions of
the elements of zealous advocacy, as embodied by the NLADA
Standards, is particularly important given the phenomenon of “ethical
fading.” Ethical fading is “the cognitive tendency of individuals to
conflate acting ethically with acting in a self-interested way.”187
Perceiving our desired actions as unethical leads to cognitive
dissonance (“as a good person, how could my actions be unethical?”)
and a corresponding desire to find a way to relieve the dissonance. As
described by one of the founding scholars on the subject, “[b]ecause
the occurrence of cognitive dissonance is unpleasant, people are
motivated to reduce it; this is roughly analogous to the processes
involved in the induction and reduction of such drives as hunger or
thirst—except that, here, the driving force arises from cognitive
discomfort rather than physiological needs.”188

phenomenon in criminal, bankruptcy and family law).
185
Smith, supra note 55, at 92 (citation omitted).
186
Id. at 118.
187
Paul R. Tremblay & Judith A. McMorrow, Lawyers and the New Institutionalism, 9
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 568, 579 (2011).
188
Andrew J. McClurg, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using Cognitive Dissonance Theory to Reduce
Policy Lying, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 389, 424 (1999) (quoting ELLIOT ARONSON, THE
SOCIAL ANIMAL 178 (7th ed., 1995)).
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A strong organizational culture affects the practice of ethical
fading by providing a “‘default’ orientation toward which the ‘fading’
tends.”189 This is partly because “social organization and, in particular,
community norms are almost always more important influences on
individual conduct than formal rules.” Although more emphasis has
been placed on the negative effects of ethical fading, it is possible that
organizational culture promoting strong ethical norms would have a
comparably powerful effect in a positive direction.190
While the standards have been developed with specificity for
certain aspects of criminal practice, Jenny Roberts has shown how
standards are limited or absent in the particular context of
misdemeanor court.191 She demonstrates how the absence of such
powerfully articulated norms permits ineffective assistance of counsel
in that arena.192 The rest of this Article explores the absence of strongly
articulated norms in immigration, too, and examines the implications
of that absence.
B. The Immigration Bar in the Absence of Heightened Standards
1. Structure of the Immigration Bar and Disciplinary
Mechanisms
Like other administrative law bars, the immigration bar practices
in a complicated world, often hidden from the view of mainstream
legal practitioners. There are two basic streams of immigration
matters: affirmative applications submitted seeking benefits from the
Department of Homeland Security, and administrative exclusion and
removal hearings conducted by the Executive Office for Immigration
Review (“EOIR”), situated in the Department of Justice. This Article
focuses on the EOIR removal hearings, although many of the same
issues apply in DHS applications. EOIR removal hearings address one
of two principal legal matters, although procedurally, each looks
189

Tremblay & McMorrow, supra note 187, at 579.
“The new institutionalism, however, does not suggest that the norm creation
will inevitably erode ethical decision-making.” Tremblay & McMorrow, supra note 187,
at 579 (quoting Brown, supra note 174, at 813).
191
Professor Roberts cites a lack of case law applying Strickland to the lower
criminal courts. Roberts, supra note 131, at 315–22. She also notes the extremely
limited applicability of professional standards like those from the ABA or the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. “[T]he [ABA Criminal Justice] Standards
do not address the ways in which defense counsel might effectively represent
misdemeanor clients, given the particular needs and challenges of misdemeanor
representation, when the right to counsel applies. There is a similar lack of guidance
in other standards . . .” Id. at 329.
192
Id.
190
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almost exactly the same. One kind of hearing determines whether
someone who has not yet been formally admitted can be admitted, or
instead must be removed; this hearing happens whether or not the
individual has physically entered the U.S. prior to the removal process
beginning and the key question is admissibility. The other kind of
hearing determines whether someone who has already been formally
admitted can be removed, and the key question is deportability.193
Those authorized to appear before EOIR courts include both
attorneys and a wide range of permissible non-attorney
representatives. Federal regulations permit not just licensed attorneys,
but also supervised law students and law graduates, representatives
accredited by the Board of Immigration Appeals (a component of
EOIR), foreign lawyers, and other “reputable individuals.”194
Those appearing in immigration tribunals are subject to at least
two different sets of ethics rules. First, as federal administrative
tribunals operated by the Department of Justice, practitioners are
subject to the professional conduct rules that EOIR has promulgated
specifically for the immigration courts, 195 which encompass many, but
not all, of the same principles as the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, and they may be sanctioned for violating those rules.196 James
Gavin, an immigration lawyer who has been active in AILA’s ethics
work, has categorized these rules, noting that only five of the thirteen
193

The difference between these two types of cases is critical. For example, in
“Conditional Admission” and Other Mysteries: Setting the Record Straight on the “Admission”
Status of Refugees and Asylees, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 37 (2014), Laura TjanMurray states:
A noncitizen’s “admission” status is fundamental to his or her procedural
options and constitutional standing. First, it determines whether the
noncitizen is subject to the grounds of inadmissibility or deportability in
removal proceedings. Generally speaking, the latter are far more
favorable to noncitizens. A noncitizen’s admission status also may
control whether she is eligible for bond or subject to mandatory
detention over the course of proceedings, including during any
government appeal of a victory by the noncitizen at trial. Even more
sobering, whether a noncitizen is deemed “admitted” may be decisive as
to whether she possesses any constitutional right to be released from
detention following a removal order—or may be incarcerated
indefinitely. Finally, whether and when a noncitizen has been
“admitted” can determine whether she is eligible for a defense to
removal or is removable at all.
194
8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(a) (2008). Although there are no publicly available statistics
on the breakdown of kinds of appearances, this last category of “reputable individuals”
appears to be very rare; I have not yet encountered such an appearance in immigration
court, while other categories are reasonably common.
195
8 C.F.R. § 1003.102 (2003).
196
8 C.F.R. § 1003.103 (2003) (Immediate suspension and summary disciplinary
proceedings).
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have analogs in the Model Rules, while others like the prohibition
against “contumelious and otherwise obnoxious conduct” and
“repeated lateness for hearings” do not.197 Second, those practitioners
who are licensed attorneys are subject to the rules of the state bar(s) to
which they have been admitted. As discussed in Part IV, infra, those
state rules may conflict with EOIR rules, especially where the EOIR
rules lean more toward duties to the tribunal and not to the client.198
Immigration lawyers are subject to the same disciplinary
mechanisms as any of their non-immigration peers, including censure,
suspension, and disbarment. These mechanisms can be used both by
states and by the Department of Justice.199 The extent to which they are
used is a separate, important question. EOIR publishes a list of
suspended and expelled practitioners; as of February 2015, that list
contained 622 names, of which 198 were disbarred, 88 suspended
indefinitely, and almost all of the rest suspended between 30 days and
10 years.200 What cannot be gleaned from EOIR data is the number of
complaints brought against attorneys—whether directly to EOIR or
through state bars—that went nowhere, and why. What also cannot be
discovered is how many complaints were not brought in the first place.
Particularly when victims of ineffective assistance are deported, they
may be unable to pursue a complaint from outside the country.201 Even
those not deported may be insufficiently familiar with the U.S. legal
system to be aware of their right to file such complaints—often
complaints are filed if and when they acquire new counsel who can
diagnose the prior ineffectiveness. On the other hand, one factor
197

James G. Garvin, Multi-Jurisdictional Disciplinary Enforcement, in AILA, ETHICS IN
BRAVE NEW WORLD: PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY, AND
RISK MANAGEMENT FOR IMMIGRATION PRACTITIONERS, 84 (2004).
198
See, e.g., Lauren Gilbert, Facing Justice: Ethical Choices in Representing Immigrant
Clients, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 219 (2007); REID TRAUTZ, WHEN GOOD LAWYERS GO
BAD: STRATEGIES TO REDUCE YOUR RISKS (AILA 2007).
199
Executive Office of Immigration Review, List of Currently Disciplined Practitioners,
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/discipline.htm (last visited
Feb. 28, 2015) [hereinafter EOIR DISCIPLINE LIST]. State bar associations also post
information on attorneys disciplined for various violations of professional conduct in
the immigration setting, although the data are not published by field of practice and
are therefore difficult to aggregate. See., e.g., Maryland Attorney Grievance
Commission, Maryland Attorneys Disciplinary Actions FY 2015, MDCOURTS.GOV,
http://www.courts.state.md.us/attygrievance/sanctions15.html (last visited Feb. 28,
2015).
200
EOIR DISCIPLINE LIST, supra note 199.
201
The complaint form itself presumes a location within the United States. EOIR,
Immigration Practitioner Complaint Form, available at http://www.justice.gov/
eoir/eoirforms/eoir44.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2015). Even if someone filed the
complaint from another country, the process often involves interviews with witnesses,
and that could prove difficult for complainants outside the country. Id.
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pushes for more complaints to be filed: those who do remain in the
United States, and have sophisticated legal knowledge or effective new
counsel, have an incentive to file complaints as a basis for reopening
their cases. Matter of Lozada permits immigrants to reopen their cases
on the basis of prior ineffective assistance of counsel, but must file a
bar complaint to qualify for reopening.202
2. Reputation of the Immigration Bar
Whether due to the mix of individuals able to appear, the
complexity of the law itself, or some other difficulty, the immigration
bar (broadly defined) has a poor reputation. Nightmare stories of
ineffective, incompetent and fraudulent attorneys abound, such as the
case study of a New York attorney, Joseph Muto, who routinely missed
hearings and was ultimately disbarred in New York for acting as a front
for non-lawyers manufacturing fraudulent cases203 (although his
punishment before EOIR itself was only a seven year suspension).204
Another case is that of the Father Bob Vitaligione, an accredited
representative who was beloved for providing representation to
thousands of needy individuals, until the extent of his incompetence
was revealed.205 In both cases, the practitioners seemed to be stepping
in to help meet immense legal needs, perhaps demonstrating the view
that any lawyer—even an overworked one—was better than no lawyer.
But in both cases, their missteps, mistakes and, in the case of Muto,
fraud, did more damage to their clients than might have happened
with no lawyer at all.206
202

Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (B.I.A. 1988), overruled by Matter of
Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 711 (B.I.A. 2009), vacated, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 1 (B.I.A.
2009). The Lozada approach has been criticized from many angles. The Attorney
General in Compean noted that “[b]y making the actual filing of a bar complaint a
prerequisite for obtaining (or even seeking) relief, it appears that Lozada may
inadvertently have contributed to the filing of many unfounded or even frivolous
complaints.” Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 737. One scholar proposed doing away with
the bar complaint requirement, noting that the goals of validity and notice are met by
other aspects of the Lozada procedure. Aliza B. Kaplan, A New Approach to Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 345, 367–68 (2010).
203
Richard L. Abel, Practicing Immigration Law in Filene’s Basement, 84 N.C. L. REV.
1449 (2006).
204
EOIR DISCIPLINE LIST, supra note 199.
205
Sam Dolnick, Removal of Priest’s Cases Exposes Deep Hole in Immigration Courts, N.Y.
TIMES (July 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/nyregion/priests-formercaseload-exposes-holes-in-immigration-courts.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
206
Indeed, regulations require that both the Immigration Judge and ICE attempt
to identify what relief might be available for pro se individuals, and judges often urge
individuals for whom some relief might be available to try even harder to find an
attorney for their case. At least the “regulations require” claim should have a citation.
Such a pro se individual is far better off than if represented at the outset by someone
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Due to well-known stories like those above and many others, as
prominent immigration attorney Michael Maggio noted, “the
collective ethical reputation of the immigration bar, which has never
been great, is worse now than ever.”207 Maggio, whose own zealous
advocacy was a trademark of his career,208 thoughtfully lays out the
multiple dimensions of the ethics challenges facing the immigration
bar, noting how some of the least experienced immigration
practitioners are among the most likely to be working on the most
complex cases for the most vulnerable clients. More seasoned lawyers,
he notes, tend to derive business from the world of labor certifications,
which require craftsmanship and great skill, but are not as treacherous
as removal proceedings, asylum cases and so forth.209
The American Immigration Lawyers Association has done
enormous work trying to address the challenge noted by Michael
Maggio. In addition to employing someone full time to educate
members on ethics issues, the website for AILA members features
practice and professionalism prominently on its homepage, and links
to ethics publications and state-by-state compendia of rules providing
guidance to immigration lawyers.210 It also has a message board where
members can seek guidance on ethical obligations and dilemmas, but
these mostly focus on matters beyond removal proceedings (such as
the dual representation problems in employment-based and familybased applications).211 Given the non-adversarial context of these
inquiries, it is perhaps unsurprising that the thoughtful analysis found
in these resources tends to be fairly conservative in its approach—
focusing carefully on lawyer liability exposure, and not on zealous
like Muto or Vitaligione who misses hearings, fails to screen for relief, and concedes
removability or seeks voluntary departure when other, better courses of action were
available.
207
Michael Maggio, Matter of Ethics, in BRAVE NEW WORLD supra, note 157.
208
Patricia Sullivan, Immigration Lawyer Michael A. Maggio, WASH. POST (Feb. 12,
2008),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2008-02-12/news/36922813_1_fightdeportation-immigration-lawyer-ins-agents; Firm Carries on Michael Maggio’s Pro Bono
Legacy, AILA , http://ailahub.aila.org/i/49654/2 (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
209
Maggio, supra note 207.
210
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, www.aila.org (last visited Feb. 28,
2015). A post in the message board available to members solicits ethics articles that
AILA is interested in publishing, and suggests that “possible topics include advertising
immigration legal services across state lines, application of ethics rules on global
practice, ‘unbundling’ legal services, and oversight of independent paralegals.” (Post,
Sept. 20, 2013). While these are undoubtedly important topics, they do not cover
anything close to the topic of zealous advocacy in immigration removal.
211
See, e.g., Jill Marie Bussey & Jane W. Chen, A Primer on the Ethical Considerations
in Family-Based Practice, AILA (2010); Trautz, supra note 198; Hilary Sheard, Ethical
Issues in Immigration Proceedings, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 719 (1995).
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advocacy for clients.
Furthermore, AILA—while exceptionally
influential for immigration practitioners—is a membership
organization, and not all immigration lawyers pay the dues needed to
access these resources.212
In the removal context, one resource does lay out detailed steps
that lawyers can take to prepare and defend their cases effectively: The
Immigration Trial Handbook.213 This resource has a wealth of
information relevant to different stages of trial preparation, and
provides a path for advocates to be extremely effective, and at times
zealous.214 It carries less authority for articulating standards of
zealousness for the profession, however, than something like the
NLADA standards developed for criminal defenders.215 It is a private
publication not developed as part of an effort to reach consensus about
professional standards of effectiveness. As such, it falls well short of
even the voluntary NLADA standards. Clearly, many lawyers do
routinely practice zealously in immigration removal; the concern of
this article is that they are unsupported and too often alone, not able
to relay on a legal culture shared throughout the immigration bar.
The flip side of this tarnished coin is that those lawyers who do not
practice zealously have no commonly accepted standards in this
practice area showing them precisely the degree to which they are
falling short.
3. Efforts to Extend Gideon
Into this confounding world where lawyers and many kinds of
non-lawyers can practice, and where unique and multiple ethical rules
govern those who practice, come the questions of right to counsel, and
the importance of that counsel being effective. The former question
has been studied in some depth, but only recently has attention turned
212

It is not possible to state how many immigration lawyers are not AILA members,
especially because attorneys practicing in immigration court may consider themselves
general practitioners working in multiple fields. But the dues likely price some
percentage of lawyers out of membership, even where they are interested. For 2014,
they range from $125 for non-profit attorneys to $455 for regular members with 7+
years of practice. 2014 AILA Dues Structure, AILA.ORG, http://www.aila.org/
membership/join (last visited Feb. 28, 2015). For an excellent study of the impact of
AILA on immigration lawyer practices and actions, see Leslie Levin, Specialty Bars as a
Site of Professionalism : The Immigration Bar Example, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 194 (2011).
213
MARIA BALDINI-POTERMIN, IMMIGRATION TRIAL HANDBOOK (2013) [hereinafter
IMMIGRATION TRIAL HANDBOOK].
214
Id. at § 7:12. For example, it says that “counsel can and should object to [the]
admission” of Form-213 when it contains information the client disputes.
215
Blue Ribbon Advisory Committee on Indigent Defense Services (1996), NLADA.ORG,
available at http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_Standards/Blue_Ribbon.
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to the latter question.216
The right to appointed counsel matters in a world where so many
are unrepresented. During FY 2012, only 56 percent of immigrants
had representation in removal proceedings.217 The increasing use of
detention, particularly in isolated locations, also decreases the ability
of immigrants to secure representation.218 Pro bono legal services for
detainees are exceptionally limited, largely because of time and travel
costs associated with access to far-flung facilities, such that a single twohour interview with one client might consume 8–10 hours of an
attorney’s day.219 At the same time and travel costs make private
representation more expensive than many detainees can afford.220
Even facilities close to major metropolitan areas have very low rates of
representation for detainees, with one New York study showing only 40
percent have counsel by the time their hearing is completed
(compared to 73 percent for those who are not detained).221 Farther
afield, that rate tumbles to 21 percent.222 And “farther afield” is
increasingly the norm in immigration detention. With roughly 36
percent of the immigration courts’ cases comprised of detained
cases,223 these high rates of being unrepresented represent a significant
problem.
Since 1989, there have been programs around the country trying
to improve access to justice by providing pro bono representation and/
or legal representation to detainees in different ways.224 The Florence
216

Compare Beth Werlin, Renewing the Call: Immigrants’ Right to Appointed Counsel in
Deportation Proceedings, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 393 (2000) with Hamutal Bernstein
and Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Improving Immigration Adjudications Through Competent
Counsel, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55 (2008).
217
EOIR STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 145, at G1.
218
Stacy Caplow has done statistical analysis of the rise of detained cases within the
immigration court system. Stacy Caplow, After the Flood: The Legacy of the Surge of Federal
Immigration Appeals, 7 NW J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 25–26 (2012). Criticisms of ICE’s
detention quota abound. See e.g., Morgenthau, supra note 148.
219
Consider, for example, an attorney in Washington, D.C. representing a
detainee in Farmville, Virginia, 170 miles away. Driving time each way is roughly three
hours without traffic, and there can be significant delays between arriving at the
detention facility and actually seeing the detainee client.
220
Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation for Detained Immigrants Facing
Deportation: Varick Street Detention Facility, A Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541, 548–59
(2009).
221
The New York Immigrant Representation Study: Preliminary Findings, N.Y. TIMES (May
3, 2011), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/050411
immigrant.pdf.
222
Id.
223
EOIR STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 145, at O1.
224
Ingrid V. Eagly has examined the ways that current legal service provision (via
non-profits, pro bono representation, and law school clinics) could provide a
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Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project has been representing
immigrants and providing legal information to thousands of
unrepresented immigrants at detention facilities in Arizona since
1989, and in that same year the American Bar Association, AILA and
the State Bar of Texas set up ProBar to improve access to justice for
immigrants in South Texas.225 Since that time, legal orientation
programs (LOPs) have increased massively in scale, under the
monitoring of the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Access
Programs.226
Since 2008, the American Bar Association, in
collaboration with several other entities, founded the Immigration
Justice Project of San Diego to respond to the crisis in lack of
representation. The project uses a network of pro bono attorneys to
“promote due process and access to justice at all levels of the
immigration and appellate court system.”227 The project specifically
notes that the pro bono assistance is to be of “high-quality,” although
it does not define that term.228
Recognizing that such programs are, at best, a patchwork
solution, there have been increasing—and increasingly effective—calls
from the bar, policy advocates and legal scholars to recognize a right
to appointed counsel in specific contexts. The quest to extend Gideon
to the immigration context began decades ago and has been studied
and justified in academic and policy literature.229 These authors seek
foundation for expanding Gideon to immigration practice. Eagly, supra note 74.
225
Our History, THE FLORENCE IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE RIGHTS PROJECT,
http://www.firrp.org/who/history/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2015); What Is ProBAR,
PROBAR DETENTION PROJECT, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/immigration/probar/probaradultsbrochure7-12.authcheckdam.pdf
(last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
226
Office of Legal Access Programs, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/
eoir/probono/probono.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
227
Immigration Justice Project (IJP) of San Diego: About Us, ABA.ORG,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_services/immigration/projects_initiati
ves/immigration_justice_project_ijp_of_san_diego/about_us.html (last visited Feb.
28. 2015).
228
Id. Professor Andrew Schoenholtz and Hamutal Bernstein also note the
importance of competence: “The crucial role of competent representation is one of
the motivating factors behind the ABA Immigration Justice Project, which seeks not
only to provide representation but also to train and prepare counsel in order to
provide competent services.” Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Hamutal Bernstein, Improving
Immigration Adjudications Through Competent Counsel, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 59
(2008).
229
See, e.g., Lucas Guttentag & Ahilan Arulanantham, Extending the Promise of Gideon:
Immigration, Deportation, and the Right to Counsel, 39 ABA HUMAN RIGHTS MAGAZINE, no.
4, (2013), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_
home/2013_vol_39/vol_30_no_4_gideon/extending_the_promise_of_gideon.html;
Donald Kerwin, Revisiting the Need for Appointed Counsel no. 4 (Apr. 2005),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/revisiting-need-appointed-counsel; Beth I.
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the extension of Gideon appointed counsel to immigration proceedings
generally, for reasons very similar to the ones set forth in Part I, supra,
comparing the immigration and criminal systems’ stakes, complexity
and power-imbalances.230 Others have begun the process of defining
specific contexts within immigration law that might justify the
appointment of counsel.231
The phenomenon of appointed counsel in the immigration
context is becoming more widespread for two reasons: development of
case law providing counsel as a matter of due process, and expansion
of appointed counsel through statutes or Government programs. First,
the M-A-M- case recognized deficiencies in the due process available to
mentally incompetent immigrants in the immigration court system.232
The court in M-A-M- considered the Fifth Amendment due process
rights of immigrants in removal proceedings, applying the standard of
“fundamental fairness” to the question of whether a mentally
incompetent individual had a right to appointed counsel in this
particular civil context.233 Turner v. Rogers234 which examined the right
to counsel in a child support enforcement case where the father was
incarcerated, likewise offered a framework for evaluating Fifth
Amendment due process right to counsel. While the Court found no
right in that particular case, its framework, as scholar Ingrid Eagly has
shown, could justify appointed counsel in the immigration context.235
Werlin, Renewing the Call: Immigrants’ Right to Appointed Counsel in Deportation Proceedings,
20 B. C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 393 (2000).
230
Id.
231
Kevin Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent Residents, 122 YALE
L.J. 2394 (2013) (appointment of counsel for lawful permanent residents in removal
proceedings); Noferi, supra note 107 (appointment of counsel for hearings to
determine whether mandatory detention applies); Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is
Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1359–60 (2011) (right to counsel for immigrants
in removal proceedings because of a criminal conviction, post-Padilla).
232
Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474 (B.I.A. 2011). This marked a leap forward
from the statutory standard simply requiring the mentally incompetent individual’s
rights to be protected, without stating how such rights were to be protected:
If it is impracticable by reason of an alien’s mental incompetency for the
alien to be present at the proceeding, the Attorney General shall
prescribe safeguards to protect the rights and privileges of the alien . . . .
The Act’s invocation of safeguards presumes that proceedings can go
forward, even where the alien is incompetent, provided the proceeding
is conducted fairly.
Id. at 477 (internal citations omitted).
233
Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I & N Dec. 474 (B.I.A. 2011).
234
131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).
235
Eagly, supra note 74, at 2302–03 (noting that if the framework requires
“weighing case complexity, representation status of the parties, and available
procedural safeguards” it could justify appointed counsel in the immigration context).
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Second, appointed counsel is increasing as a legislative matter,
and may continue to increase through immigration and other reforms.
The Senate immigration bill, passed in June 2013, permitted
appointed counsel for any proceeding at the discretion of the
immigration judge, but required appointment of counsel for minors
and mentally incompetent individuals.236 Then, without waiting for
federal reform, New York City created the first publicly funded
“defender system” for immigrants in removal proceedings, in July
2013.237 The $500,000 allocation creates a pilot project that would
provide representation to 135 individuals.238 If expanded, the project
would coordinate a network of lawyers drawn from both private firms
and non-profit immigration legal service providers.239 As Ingrid Eagly
has noted, “[r]egardless of how courts ultimately resolve the
constitutional question, all levels of Government retain the ability to
take legislative action to expand access to appointed counsel.”240
C. New Focus on Effectiveness of Counsel
Clearly, appointed counsel is increasing, and likely to increase
further, either through litigation or legislation. Appointment of
counsel is, however, merely a starting point in considering access to
justice. Increasingly, scholars are also looking at the effectiveness of
the counsel that immigrants do have.
As Professor Andrew
Schoenholtz and Hamutal Bernstein write:

236

S.B. 744, § 3502(c) (2013) reads:
Notwithstanding subsection (b) [providing discretionary authority to
appoint counsel], the Attorney General shall appoint counsel, at the
expense of the Government, if necessary, to represent an alien in a
removal proceeding who has been determined by the Secretary to be an
unaccompanied alien child, is incompetent to represent himself or
herself due to a serious mental disability that would be included in
section 3(2) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C.
12102(2)), or is considered particularly vulnerable when compared to
other aliens in removal proceedings, such that the appointment of
counsel is necessary to help ensure fair resolution and efficient
adjudication of the proceedings.
237
Kirk Semple, City to Help Immigrants Seeking Deportation Reprieves, N.Y. TIMES (July
27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/18/nyregion/city-to-help-immigrantsseeking-deportation-reprieves.html?ref=nyregion&_r=0.
238
Id.
239
PETER L. MARKOWITZ, PROTOCOL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PUBLIC DEFENDER
IMMIGRATION SERVICE PLAN (2009), http://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/
uploads/2011/03/Protocol.pdf.
240
Eagly, supra note 74, at 2303.
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The problem is not only lack of representation but also poor
quality of representation. Low-quality representation is too
often the case at the Immigration Court level. Some
applicants manage to secure representation, but their
representative (1) may not have the appropriate legal
expertise, (2) may be overloaded with too many cases, (3)
may not give due attention and care to individuals, or (4)
may even be fraudulent.241
Chief Immigration Judge Juan Osuna has similarly emphasized that
counsel is not enough, and that the representation itself must be good:
“Good lawyers help immigrants navigate a complex process. . . . [T]he
system overall benefits when good lawyers get involved.”242 Judge M.
Margaret McKeown and Allegra McLeod have also examined the
question of effectiveness, looking at such trademarks of bad lawyering
as placing clients unnecessarily into removal proceedings and failing
to offer evidence, concluding that the view that any lawyer is better
than no lawyer is fundamentally in error, a conclusion this Article
supports.243
Beyond avoiding the importance of avoiding such unarguably bad
lawyering (an important and herculean task in and of itself), this
Article wants to ensure that our definition of competence is defined
not against the lowest common denominator, but upward toward an
aspirational standard. The way that zealous advocacy can make a
practical difference in establishing a better standard for immigration
lawyers is the subject of the next section of this article.

IV.

THE IMPACT AND LIMITATIONS OF ZEALOUS ADVOCACY AS A
GUIDING PRINCIPLE

A. Where Zealousness Might Make a Difference
There are multiple scenarios in immigration court where
zealousness would be somewhat counter-cultural and could work to the
benefit of clients, particularly those with more limited options or cases
with weaker evidence. Certainly, many lawyers already do these things.
However, in the fast-paced world of master calendars, where dozens of
cases are processed swiftly, and trials that are condensed to just two or
241

Schoenholtz & Bernstein, supra note 228 at 59–60.
Allegra McLeod & M. Margaret McKeown, The Counsel Conundrum: Effective
Representation in Immigration Proceedings, in ANDREW I. SCHOENHOLTZ, PHILIP G. SCHRAG
& JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES, REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AND
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 286–306 (New York: New York University Press 2009).
243
Id.
242
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three hours, many of these maneuvers are exceedingly rare.
This section concretizes the notion of zealous advocacy in the
immigration context. But it is also worth noting at the outset what, in
this author’s view, zealous advocacy is not: It is not uncivil and it is not
dishonest. Zealousness may seem to demand an aggressive style or
promote a propensity to exaggerate evidence. While different lawyers
have different styles, incivility rarely serves any good purpose, and
attorney dishonesty hurts not just the integrity of the system, but the
interests of the clients known to be represented by someone with a
reputation for dishonesty. The scenarios below show multiple contexts
in which a lawyer can be zealous while remaining civil and honest.
1. Putting the Government to its Burden
The Government has the initial burden in a removal proceeding,
to establish alienage, i.e. that the immigrant is not a U.S. citizen.244
Once this burden is met, the burden shifts to the immigrant to prove
he or she has a right to remain, and/or a defense to removal.245
The Government may seek to meet its burden by submitting a
Form I-213 (“record of deportable alien”) at the initial status hearing
for a removal proceeding (the “master calendar”), although such
documents are also introduced later, just for impeachment purposes
during an individual hearing.246 The Form I-213 contains information
about the immigrant and the circumstances of his or her arrest and, if
relevant, criminal history.247 Immigration agents also include in Form
I-213 any statements made by the immigrant upon arrest by DHS, as
well as information from investigations made by ICE or other agencies
pertaining to the immigrant.248 The document is signed only by the
arresting agent, and by the receiving officer who authorizes
prosecution of the case. The court considers Form I-213 “inherently
trustworthy,” as a default matter, despite the presence of hearsay on
the document.249 The Form often contains information that is
prejudicial to the immigrant’s case, including the facts that the
Government can use to meet its burden of establishing alienage, like
244

INA § 240(c)(3)(A).
INA § 240(c)(2).
246
Matter of Ponce-Hernandez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 784, 785 (B.I.A. 1999) (“[A]bsent
any evidence that a Form I-213 contains information that is incorrect or was obtained
by coercion or duress, that document is inherently trustworthy and admissible as
evidence to prove alienage or deportability.”) (citation omitted).
247
IMMIGRATION TRIAL HANDBOOK, supra note 213, at § 7:12. Matter of Mejia, 16 I.
& N. Dec. 6 (B.I.A. 1976).
248
IMMIGRATION TRIAL HANDBOOK, supra note 213.
249
Matter of Mejia, 16 I. & N. Dec. 6, 8 (B.I.A. 1976).
245
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nationality, and date, place and manner of entry. The form may also
include allegations of criminal involvement not supported by records
of conviction.250
Despite its “inherent reliability,” advocates can challenge the
admission of the Form. One reason for objection is that rarely has the
lawyer been given a chance to examine it more than cursorily before
the Government seeks to have it admitted. The lawyer has a statutory
right to examine the evidence251 a right that is diminished when custom
and collegiality subtly pressure a decision to go along to get along and
not waste the court’s time by examining the document closely.
Another is a simple objection to its hearsay, which, while likely to be
overruled, preserves the objection for appeal if necessary; just because
an objection is unlikely to be sustained does not mean the lawyer
should resist making it. This is fairly cost-less zealous advocacy:
something well within a lawyer’s ability to do with minimal disruption
of the litigation for either side. It is thus a place where zealous
advocacy would prove easy to apply if adopted as a guiding principle.
The Government also meets its burden when the immigrant
concedes the allegations made on the Notice to Appear (Form I-286,
“NTA”).252 The NTA usually makes several factual allegations,
including: nationality, date, and place and manner of entry, and
sometimes other allegations about criminal activity, failure to remain
in status, or others. Regulations provide for many different reasons
why a notice to appear can be canceled,253 from contesting the
allegations, to asserting that the individual is actually a citizen of the
U.S., to asserting that the notice was “improvidently issued.” There is
no data available showing the number of cases where an immigrant
objects to admission of the NTA, but any observation of a master
calendar shows how unusual it is to see attorneys make objections to
the NTA or deny allegations thereon (except, sometimes, to make
technical corrections which can be—and are—rapidly resolved with
the issuance of a new NTA). When the newly created New York
Immigration Defenders corps began litigating cases, their routine
denial of NTAs sparked notice from lawyers unaccustomed to seeing
250

While frequently damaging to the immigrant’s case, the Immigration Trial
Handbook also notes that Form I-213 may contain information about the arrest that
could provide the basis for a Motion to Suppress Evidence. IMMIGRATION TRIAL
HANDBOOK, supra note 213, at § 7:12.
251
INA § 240(b)(4)(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2013).
252
8 C.F.R. § 1240.8 (2013).
253
8 C.F.R. § 239.1(a) (2013). The Immigration Trial Handbook lists eleven
different means of challenging a notice to appear, most of which derive from the
immigration regulations. IMMIGRATION TRIAL HANDBOOK, supra note 213, at 5:10.
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that done.254
When the allegations stem from evidence obtained
unconstitutionally, lawyers can—and should—deny the allegations
and pursue a Motion to Suppress Evidence. The regulations
themselves provide for this: When the NTA is “issued under
circumstances involving duress, a lack of due process, violations of a
noncitizen’s rights under the regulations, or other violation of a
constitutional right,” it may be challenged.255 Matter of Garcia256 provides
one excellent example of this, although its contours are currently the
subject of federal litigation.257 The BIA found that Mr. Garcia’s
statements were made involuntarily when the then-INS handcuffed
him and repeatedly refused him access to his attorney, even erasing
the attorney’s number from Mr. Garcia’s arm (where he had written
it).258
Beyond the regulatory violations, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza259 opened
the door to filing suppression motions under the Fourth Amendment
when abuses were egregious, and possibly even more widely than
that.260 Concurrent with the rise in immigration enforcement done by
local law enforcement agents, such constitutional issues have risen in
immigration court as well, but are still a relatively unusual basis for
challenging a NTA. This is so partly because Lopez-Mendoza is
sometimes read as saying that the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary
rule does not apply in immigration court,261 and partly because such
254

Rich commentary on this phenomenon emerged in a closed Facebook group
for private immigration lawyers. (Sept. 11, 2014) (entire thread on file with author).
255
Absent proof that a Form I-213 contains information that is incorrect or was
obtained by coercion or duress, that document is inherently trustworthy and
admissible as evidence to prove alienage and deportability or inadmissibility. Matter of
Barcenas, 19 I&N Dec. 609 (B.I.A. 1988); Matter of Mejia, 16 I&N Dec. 6 (B.I.A. 1976).
256
Matter of Garcia, 17 I.&N. Dec. 319 (B.I.A. 1980).
257
The BIA held in 2011 that statements made prior to the issuance of an NTA.
Id.
258
Id. at 320.
259
104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984).
260
The American Immigration Council Legal Action Center (affiliated with the
American Immigration Lawyers Association) has shown how much of the reasoning
behind Lopez-Mendoza’s “egregious violations” standard is based on facts no longer true
in the present-day immigration enforcement apparatus. Practice Advisory: Motions to
Suppress in Removal Proceedings: Cracking Down on Fourth Amendment Violations by State and
Local Law Enforcement Officers, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL LEGAL ACTION CENTER
(Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/motions_to_
suppress_in_removal_proceedings_cracking_down_on_fourth_amendment_violations.pdf.
261
Deborah Anker, Asylum Status, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION TRAINING, C394 ALI-ABA 355 (Apr. 1989) (citing C. Slovinsky & M. Van
Der Hout, Motions to Suppress After Delgado and Lopez–Mendoza, 13 IMMIGRATION
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litigation is poorly understood.262 Moreover, as one practice resource
notes, “[Filing a motion to suppress under the Fourth Amendment]
will not endear you to the Office of Chief Counsel and may adversely
affect how DHS trial attorneys think of you and treat you.”263 Here, the
disruption to the litigation is significant; such motions can take years
to resolve as both sides work their way through appeals. Moreover, the
reputational costs to the disruptive litigator can be significant.264
However, disruption in defense of a constitutional right is at the least
ethically defensible, under a guiding principle of zealous advocacy
would be required to be a truly effective attorney.265 Understanding the
tactic as a key piece of effectiveness might reduce the reputational costs
borne by lawyers who, at present, are litigating against cultural norms
in immigration court.
2. Fighting Within Any Given Case
Zealousness also may shape how any given case is litigated, and
will affect how well an attorney deploys motions, calls witnesses,
counsels a client, or pushes to have evidence introduced. Even where
there is no basic conflict in duties, the absence of a strongly articulated
principle of zealous advocacy matters if the legal culture, as described
in Part III(A) supra, deters such ethically permissible conduct simply
as a matter of custom.
One scenario is not unique to immigration practice but is
powerful there: the familiar scenario of the judge who wishes to hurry
along proceedings. Imagine an immigration judge who wants to rush
through testimony in a particular case because an overcrowded docket
in the system generally has left her with too little time to patiently hear
all the testimony. Does the lawyer push back and insist? Make an
objection for the record? This is not a difficult choice, and a zealous
NEWSLETTER No. 5–6 at 1 (1984).
262
See generally Maureen Sweeney, Shadow Immigration Enforcement, 104 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 227, 277-79 (2014) (describing the lack of an analytical framework for
immigration judges to determine motions to suppress, and noting the attendant
confusion when such motions are filed).
263
Motions to Suppress in Removal Proceedings: A General Overview 34, AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION COUNCIL LEGAL ACTION CENTER http://www.legalactioncenter.org/
sites/default/files/motions_to_suppress_in_removal_proceedings_a_general_overview_1-26-15_fin.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
264
From discussion of an earlier draft of this Article, at the Mid-Atlantic Clinical
Theory Workshop, held at University of Baltimore (Feb. 2014) (notes on file with
author).
265
Indeed, the Sixth Circuit just found that an unwarranted concession of
removability by an immigrant’s prior counsel constituted egregious circumstances,
sufficient to allow the individual to reopen proceedings and withdraw the original
admissions and concessions. See Hanna v. Holder, 740 F.3d 379 (6th Cir. 2014).

KEYES (DO NOT DELETE)

532

4/12/2015 9:27 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:475

advocate would do at least one of those two things. But when
zealousness is not the norm, and there are powerful pressures to please
the Court, to be a good repeat player in the system, some lawyers will
refrain from doing either of these simple litigation maneuvers,
privileging the legal system over their client.
More difficult is the question of truthfulness and the lawyer’s role
in eliciting and presenting the truth. A common example of this arises
for those seeking relief by applying for a crime-victim visa (a “U visa”)
from USCIS, an increasingly prevalent way to gain immigration
status.266 Although not adjudicated in court, courts often permit
continuances if an immigrant appears to have a chance of regularizing
status through an application to USCIS, and will postpone proceedings
while that application is adjudicated. One question asked on the U
visa application is “Have you EVER committed a crime or offense for
which you have not been arrested?”267 Some lawyers believe that they
must answer “yes” to this question if the client discloses any possible
transgressions (and because the lawyer must ensure that the client has
answered every question on the form, this is information the lawyer will
obtain from a client who is reasonably forthcoming). Others argue
that the question itself implies that that no judge or jury has found the
immigrant guilty of any offense, so it cannot be known with certainty
whether there was a crime or offense committed at all. In this view,
the lack of certainty permits a “no” answer even in the presence of
questionable conduct.268
The fact that there are two possible paths demonstrates that this
is an ethical gray area, where different actions may both be justified,
and where duties come into sharp tension. On the one hand, the path
of saying “yes” puts the lawyer in the role of being judge and jury for
266

The visa came into creation in 2000, but lacked implementing regulations until
2008. Since then, through trainings and education, it has become widely known and
widely sought. Ten thousand of such visas are available each year, and USCIS now
routinely meets that quota. USCIS Approves 10,000 U Visas for 5th Straight Fiscal Year,
USCIS (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-approves-10000-uvisas-5th-straight-fiscal-year.
267
I-918, Petition for U Nonimmigrant Status, at 3, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
SERVICES, available at http://www.uscis.gov/i-918 (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
268
Still others say that the information is protected by the Fifth Amendment right
to remain silent, but such a right must be invoked and in a civil matter, such as the
adjudication of a U visa, invocation of the right permits the decision-maker to make
an inference of guilt. See Gutierrez v. Holder, 662 F.3d 1083, 1091 (2011).
Furthermore, while in a civil proceeding, an individual may invoke the Fifth
Amendment, and let the fact-finder draw what conclusions they will from its
invocation, there is no mechanism for doing so in immigration applications, short—
perhaps—of writing “I invoke the Fifth Amendment” in the margin of the form or in
a supplement.
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their own client, which is squarely in collision with duties to the
client—and yet, to lawyers making this choice, this likely feels like a
fairly safe ethical choice, privileging the legal system over the client. It
may be unfortunate and frustrating, but not unethical. Why that seems
like the straightforward ethical choice is difficult to know. Perhaps
answering yes appeals to the lawyer’s need to prove that lawyers can be
honest, contradicting the profession’s (unearned) reputation for
pervasive dishonesty. Perhaps answering yes shows respect or even
some awe for the legal system, the same system that drew the lawyer
into the profession in the first place. Answering yes may let the lawyer
align with the legal system in a gatekeeping role that feels important,
even if wrongly ascribed in an adversarial context.269 Regardless, it is a
safe choice that is unlikely to bear any negatives consequences for the
lawyer.270
On the other hand, the defensible path of saying “no” even when
possibly the truth is “yes,” is a choice made by the zealous advocate, but
for the risk-averse among us, this choice comes uncomfortably close to
a collision with duties to the legal system. And why is that? Again, legal
cultures develop shared norms, and it is difficult for lawyers to go
against those norms. Because zealous advocacy is not the guiding
principle within immigration law, a borderline decision such as this
may lead to considerable discomfort with going against the cultural
grain. A clearer, well-defined and broadly shared value of zealousness
might ease that discomfort and make it easier to tip the balance toward
duties to the client.
Another area where lawyers self-censor is in providing evidence to
the tribunal. It is broadly understood that the Model Rules prohibit a
lawyer from acting simultaneously as witness and advocate in a
particular trial.271 However, this rule, Rule 3.7 (which has no analog in
the rules governing immigration court appearances) contains an
exception for situations where “disqualification of the lawyer would
work substantial hardship on the client.”272 Arguably, this exception
applies frequently in the context of asylum litigation, where the
attorney is a witness to efforts to corroborate the asylum-seeker’s claim.
In asylum cases, the legal standard is that applicant’s own statement

269

The gatekeeping role has been suggested in non-litigation contexts like
corporate counsel work. See W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW.
U. L. REV. 1167 (2005).
270
The reason the lawyer is unlikely to face consequences from the client whose
duty was compromised is addressed in Part III.B.1, supra.
271
ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (1983).
272
Id.

KEYES (DO NOT DELETE)

534

4/12/2015 9:27 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:475

may be sufficient to win asylum, but only when it would not be
reasonable to expect corroboration.273 This legal standard has been
criticized as disadvantaging asylum-seekers who cannot produce
adequate corroboration, and who cannot know what any particular
immigration judge will expect to be “reasonably available.”274
Sometimes the client can offer testimony about attempts to obtain
evidence, but often it is the lawyer who has done much of the case
investigation, and knows much better than the client how hard or easy
a particular document or witness statement was to obtain.275 In a wellknown case study from Georgetown Law’s Center for Applied Legal
Studies, students went to heroic lengths and deployed extraordinary
creativity to find a key witness for their client’s case.276 They succeeded,
but had they not ultimately succeeded (and not all efforts yield such
excellent results), their efforts are surely evidence relevant to the
determination of what evidence was “reasonably available” in the
case—and therefore precluding testimony would impose substantial
hardship on the client and thus meet the Rule 3.7 exception. Yet this
thorough reading of the rule, coupled with a legal culture that assumes
lawyers cannot offer testimony, could prevent such evidence from
being offered at all. A legal culture that had zealous advocacy
embedded as a guiding principle might lead more attorneys to try.
B. When Zealous Advocacy is Impossible
While zealous advocacy can resolve some dilemmas like those
described so far in this section, there are other situations in
immigration court, particularly as concerns candor to the tribunal,
where it is simply not possible. Immigration law is not unique for
experiencing tensions in the ethical rules where further guidance is
needed. Such tensions have been examined in a variety of contexts.277
Nonetheless, immigration law, and particularly the practice in
immigration court where removal hearings are heard, is rife with such
dilemmas, and those dilemmas often turn upon whether the lawyer
273

REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–13, 119 Stat. 231; 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252 (West

2015).
274

Deborah Anker, Emily Gumper, Jean C. Han & Matthew Muller, Any Real
Change? Credibility and Corroboration After the REAL ID Act, in IMMIGRATION &
NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK (2008–09).
275
See, e.g., DAVID NGARURI KENNEY & PHIL SCHRAG, ASYLUM DENIED 136 (2009)
(describing the efforts made by student attorneys to find a copy of a key news article
in an asylum case).
276
Agata Szypszak, Where in the World is Dr. Detchakandi? A Story of Fact Investigation,
6 CLINICAL L. REV. 517 (2000).
277
Andrews, supra note 14.
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chooses to favor duties to the client over duties to the court, or vice
versa. Under different sets of ethical rules, lawyers have some grey area
within which they can navigate competing duties and make a range of
choices. That range of choices is sharply curtailed in immigration
court, leaving lawyers in an untenable position.
AILA ethicist Reid Trautz introduces us to this problem:
Our profession’s ethical rules of conduct contain rules that
may appear to conflict with each other, making it difficult for
even experienced practitioners to properly apply and follow.
Among the most difficult of these arises when a client lies:
the intersection of our obligations of client confidentiality
and candor toward an adjudicative tribunal. For immigration
lawyers, this frequently manifests itself when we learn a client may
have been untruthful in an adjudicative hearing. It is in this zone
of difficulty that many lawyers find themselves, seeking a path
to extract their clients and themselves from a legal and
ethical quagmire.278
Note first, that in this example about honesty to the tribunal, that the
lawyer has learned the client may have been untruthful. Under most
rules of practice, such ambiguity about whether the client actually was
or was not untruthful permit the lawyer to continue representing the
client without any duty to share any doubts with the Court. The normal
ethical standard imposing a duty to correct the record is “actual
knowledge,”279 which does not seem to exist in this example. However,
in immigration court, the standard for knowledge included “reckless
disregard” of the possibly false story.280 So, indeed, the rules do not just
appear to conflict, in Trautz’s formulation; they do conflict.
Professor Gilbert has laid out these dilemmas and tensions in her
scholarship.281 In a wonderfully detailed case study (and one all too
familiar to anyone who has represented clients in immigration court),
she describes the multilayered dilemmas facing a particular pro bono
attorney. This attorney represented a woman who, among other issues,
made questionable, if not illegal, decisions about who to claim as a
dependent on her tax returns. This issue put the lawyer in a bind as
the immigration judge had demanded to see those tax returns as proof
of the woman’s good moral character (a requirement for the relief
being sought). Gilbert explores the shades of whether the lawyer
knew, suspected or recklessly disregarded information about the truth
278
279
280
281

Trautz, supra note 156.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1983).
8 C.F.R. § 1003.102(c) (2013).
Gilbert, supra note 198, at 234–36.
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or falsity of those returns.282 Exploring client truthfulness is an issue
familiar to all lawyers.283 But Gilbert explores how this tension is
exacerbated by numerous factors: the burden on immigrants to
provide such evidence; by the likelihood of even minor issues and
discrepancies to undermine a legal case; and by the under-resourced
overwhelmed nature of immigration court dockets—”an increasingly
draconian legal environment,” as Gilbert describes it.284
In Gilbert’s case study, the lawyer opts for solidarity with his client,
and favors zealous advocacy over candor to the tribunal where those
two values come into conflict.285 As she writes,
Faced with an ethical dilemma that threatened to derail his
client’s case, Attorney S considered not only the precise
ethical issues he was facing, but the context in which the
issues arose. Attorney S was representing a client before a
decidedly hostile government attorney and a judge with one
of the highest denial rates in the country. The stakes for his
client were extremely high. Failure to win at this stage of the
proceedings on discretionary grounds was likely to result in
Bertha’s immediate deportation.286
Such a decision may have violated the ethical rules in the lawyer’s
particular jurisdiction, because standards for what constitutes
knowledge do vary across jurisdictions. The decision also, though,
almost certainly runs afoul of the EOIR rules, which favor candor to
the tribunal and do not acknowledge the lawyer’s competing (and
here, conflicting) duties to the client.287 Recognizing that the zealous
lawyer may be liable for ethical violations, Gilbert worries about the
“chilling effect” of the recklessness standard and concludes that”
While the Model Rules would allow attorneys to exercise
discretion and their own moral judgment in deciding
whether to offer evidence they believe might be false, the
EOIR/DHS Rules appear to require practitioners to evaluate
the veracity of their clients’ testimony or the authenticity of
their documentation and decline to offer such evidence if
they suspect it may be false . . . . Subjecting practitioners to
disciplinary sanctions for offering probative evidence that
the attorneys suspect may be false is likely to have a chilling
282

Id.
See generally Lisa G. Lerman & Philip G. Schrag, Lawyers’ Duties to Courts,
Adversaries and Others: Truth and Falsity in Litigation, in ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE
PRACTICE OF LAW (3d ed. 2012).
284
Gilbert, supra note 198, at 220.
285
Id. at 258.
286
Id. at 258–59.
287
Id.
283
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effect on advocacy, pose a serious threat to the independence
of immigration practitioners, and result in abuse of authority
by immigration judges and DHS, upon whom practitioners
become dependent for the right to practice.288
Gilbert closes her article by assessing that attorneys may be guided
more by fear of liability under the EOIR rules, and less by the needs of
their clients, an untenable situation.289
Other dilemmas emerge in the context of an applicant’s criminal
activity. Frequently in immigration law, the structure of the process
and the nature of the applications for relief from removal require the
immigrant to incriminate him or herself in some criminal wrongdoing;
forms for common applications like asylum or cancellation of removal
ask about criminal offenses committed, and the inquiry is not limited
to convictions.290 Regulations require that the attorney provide all the
client’s criminal records to the Court.291 This is a reversal of the
criminal context, where the Government has the duty to disclose
exculpatory information,292 the defender has no affirmative duty to
present any evidence at all, and the accused has the right to remain
silent. By contrast, here the immigrant—in removal, but affirmatively
seeking something from the Government—has no such shields. For
the most part, because applicants’ biometric information is used to
produce their criminal records,293 the duty is simply acquiescing to the
inevitable with no actual harm done to the clients’ interests: the
Government already possesses the information. However, not all
criminal records are equally readily available, and when the
Government does not find a record, but it comes to the attention of
the lawyer, the lawyer now faces the stark choice between honoring her
duty to the Court, by producing the record, and her duty to her client,
whose chance at relief may now be reduced or destroyed by the
disclosure. This is the scenario envisioned in the Cynthia case
described at the beginning of this Article,294 when the lawyer dug with
her client to discover where the mysterious missing conviction record
288

Id. 229–30.
Id. at 260.
290
EOIR Application for Cancellation of Removal and Adjustment of Status for Certain
Nonpermanent Residents, at 5, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 2014), available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoirforms/eoir42b.pdf ; USCIS Application for Asylum and
Withholding of Removal, at 8, UCSIS.GOV (Dec. 29, 2014), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i-589.pdf.
291
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A) (2013); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (2013).
292
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
293
Fingerprints, UCSIS.GOV, http://www.uscis.gov/forms/fingerprints (last visited
Feb. 28, 2015).
294
See Introduction, supra, and text accompanying notes 2–4.
289
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might be found.
In the moment before asking that digging question of the client,
zealousness for the client should have stopped the student from
inquiring further. She had done her due diligence, and could honestly
stand before the court and said “we went to the courthouses to get the
records, and this conviction did not come up, and we do not know what
it was about.” Now, however, she knew. And her duty to produce the
record came into sharp conflict with her duty to her client—because
the theft made her ineligible for Cancellation because it was
considered an aggravated felony for immigration purposes. Every
actor in the Court that day felt a weight of frustration with this
outcome. The law prevented the Judge from granting the relief he
thought she merited, and the student-attorneys, exercising their
ethical obligations, had given him the information that led to that
result.
It is worth stepping back a moment and thinking about the
competing purposes of these duties in the first place. The duty to our
clients is, of course, designed to promote trust so that the client can
confide in the lawyer with the utmost confidence that her or his
interests will be protected as a result of divulging the truth. The duty
to the court helps ensure a well-functioning legal system, one in which
all the players can have confidence because all the actors are behaving
according to known, understood, shared rules. And the benefits are
not just to the system, but also to the litigants. A growing body of
scholarship and empirical work on the idea of “procedural justice”
shows that litigants value a fair system even when they ultimately lose
their case.295 Lawyers, too, can derive satisfaction from an ethos of
“playing by the rules”; respect for the rules feels virtuous, and can be
far more comfortable that working along the edges of the rules and
perhaps engaging in (civil) confrontation with opposing parties and
the Court along the way.
When such important duties collide, then, there is a significant
cost. What the dilemmas above show is that in immigration
proceedings, where applicants must present information affirmatively
in order to defend against removal, the client is wrong to trust the
lawyer, because the lawyer is not always going to be able to protect the

295

Legal scholars have imported this idea from the realm of social psychology. See,
e.g., Deborah A. Goldfarb, Shaping Perceptions of Justice: A Familial Model of Procedural
Justice, 82 UMKC L. REV. 465, 466 (2014) (citing, inter alia, John Thiabaut & Lauren
Walker, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975) and Rebecca
Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal Courts, 63 HASTINGS
L.J. 127 (2011)).
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client’s confidences so long as duties to the court triumph over duties
to the client.296 And there is a true cost associated with that for the
client. But the costs do not stop with the client; they also extend to the
system as a whole, which is predicated on clients trusting their lawyers.
There are myriad reasons ex ante why clients might not trust their
lawyers—from the reputation of the immigration bar generally to
cultural views about lawyers to more individual fears about engaging
with authority figures—and in the immigration context, people are
sometimes coming from countries where lawyers are not as
independent as they are in the United States.297 Now, to a situation
where trust is difficult to establish, we add structural factors that make
trust even riskier—and we set up incentives for savvy clients, and
perhaps all clients, to be less than fully honest with their attorneys. In
such a context, the goals of the legal system itself are ill-served.
C. Ways Through the Impasse
As the above scenarios suggest, commitment to a principle of
zealous advocacy could provide a useful and necessary counterbalance
to the skewed adversarial world of immigration court. A wellarticulated principle could become a touchstone for attorneys going
against the current cultural grain, and help build a new legal culture
within the world of immigration court. This Article has begun the
work of providing the theoretical justification for such a principle, and
has demonstrated numerous contexts in which it would make a
significant difference to the conduct and outcome of immigration
removal cases. The simplest conclusion to draw from this is that
leaders of the bar, mentors to new attorneys, and teachers of law
students must do more to articulate, elevate, and embody this principle
so that cultural change will follow.
A principle of zealous advocacy is not all-powerful, however.
Given that there are situations where the rules of professional conduct
in immigration court actually prevent a lawyer from being a zealous
advocate for her client, what are the lawyer’s options? Hew to the
lowest common denominator, being as zealous as the court-favoring
rules permit (which is not particularly zealous)? Advocate for a change
in the rules that will permit ethical practice that also allows for
296

Stephen Ellman portrays this dilemma starkly in his article on the ethics of
interviewing. Stephen Ellman, Truth and Consequences, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 895 (2000).
297
See, e.g., 2014 Report of Special Rapporteur on the Country Visit to El Salvador, at ¶¶
90–95, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (May
24, 2013), available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/
23/43/Add.1.
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zealousness? Determine that those rules are morally inferior and thus
less worthy of respect? Engage in civil disobedience to defy the rules?
The last two options fail for different reasons. Indeed, though
similar in act—breaking the rules—the two options differ importantly.
Disregarding rules from a private judgment that the rules lack moral
authority is not the same as civil disobedience. Civil disobedience
requires making the disagreement public, and accepting the legal
consequences of violating the rules. This Article in no way endorses
the view that rules may simply be ignored—indeed, much of the
analysis above shows simply how to work more zealously within these
existing rules, flawed as they sometimes are.
This Article also suggests now that the time is not right for civil
disobedience. The argument for civil disobedience is that lawyers are
being asked to resolve irresolvable moral tensions. Arguably, when two
sets of professional conduct rules permit two different outcomes, as in
this hypothetical, the one more favorable to duties to the client should
outweigh the one set by the court itself: as a moral issue, the two are
not equal, as one set of rules was developed by lawyers who endure the
competing duties, and the other set was developed by a court with a
strong self-interest in favoring the duty to the court over duties to the
client. Civil disobedience is a way of expressing dissent with that status
quo, and lawyers do have a right and an ability to engage in civil
disobedience,298 but civil disobedience is truly justified when the legal
system fails to accommodate any other forms of dissent, and where
dissent through lawful channels has been stifled and stymied.299 It is
not the case that lawful channels have been exhausted on this issue;
indeed, very little action has taken place beyond regulatory comments,
to even raise the difficulties explored in this Article. Furthermore, as
a practical point, the question of lawyers engaging in civil disobedience
has been justified in the context of actions taken outside of the lawyer’s
client matters (civil disobedience on issues of concern to the public,
not to a particular client). A lawyer’s stance in protesting a policy by,
for example, being part of a sit-in at the Capitol to get arrested, is
unlikely to directly affect the lawyer’s clients.300 But any act of civil
disobedience in the context of a removal proceeding would likely
result in chaos, impossible disruptions to the legal process, and severe
298

Robert M. Palumbos, Within Each Lawyer’s Conscience a Touchstone: Law, Morality,
and Attorney Civil Disobedience, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1057 (2005).
299
Id.
300
If newsworthy enough, perhaps a judge or ICE attorney would hear of it and
that could affect their attitudes to the lawyer and, by extension, to the lawyer’s clients,
but the risks of this seem attenuated at best.
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prejudice to the client.301
Nor is hewing to an ethical “lowest common denominator” a
sufficient response. A typical view taken from a different sphere of
immigration practice (business immigration) suggests that “[d]espite
the complexity of the client’s situation, it is always prudent to remain well
within the boundary line of what is ethical. Since this boundary line is often
amorphous and can shift, subject to varying interpretations, why should the
lawyers take a risk?”302 Although written about a different context, this
quotation also seemingly describes too much of immigration removal
practice. The Article has shown that in removal proceedings, the
answer to “why take a risk” is the very nature of the proceedings, the
stakes involved, and the disparities of power between the sides.
In removal proceedings, hewing to safe, familiar standards (ones
that do not elevate zealous advocacy as the guiding principle) is likely
to set up the client to lose in any collision between duties to the court
and duties to the client. So many factors work against immigrants in
the removal system that their representatives must approach the
boundary lines wherever possible, and seek to push those boundaries
where there are decent arguments to do so. And as the previous
sections have shown, it is possible to be far more zealous within the
confines of those boundary lines than might seem possible from the
vantage point of a risk-averse legal culture.
Zealous advocacy can often be as ethical as a more conservative
approach, even when it feels like it is a risk. And when an ethical
strategy or approach works to the advantage of the client, the client’s
interests must be foremost on their representatives’ minds, thus
forcing an effective lawyer to reject a safer option chosen merely
because it is safe.
The first significant way through the impasses sketched above,
therefore, is a simple one—to elevate the principle of zealous advocacy
such that it feels like a routine, expected choice and not a risky one.
Changing the legal culture to embrace principles of zealous advocacy
will encourage the risk-averse to see their zone of permissible, ethical
conduct more broadly and to approach the boundary lines more
fearlessly.

301

How, for example, could a lawyer forthrightly disavow a duty to the court
without indirectly revealing that the client has something negative the lawyer is
refusing to disclose?
302
Cyrus D. Mehta, Howard S. Myers & Kathleen Campbell Walker, How to Walk the
Ethical Line: Being Less Stressed Out 51 (2011), available at http://www.ailawebcle.org/
resources/Resources%20for%2012-13-11%20Seminar.pdf.
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The second way through the impasse is to identify the areas where
zealous advocacy—and therefore effective lawyering—is impossible,
and begin challenging the structures that give rise to these
impossibilities, including the rules of conduct for immigration
practitioners themselves. This Article has attempted to identify some
of those areas, but has just begun a task worthy of fuller development.
But even just drawing from two of the impossible situations described
above, we could imagine immigration attorneys deploying regulatory
processes, advocacy or impact litigation to alter the underlying
problems giving rise to the ethical dilemmas. For example, attorneys
could seek to renegotiate the terms of EOIR’s rules governing
professional conduct of immigration practitioners, so that the
recklessness test is abated, or could file a lawsuit challenging the
overbroad formulation of the question on the U visa application
seeking information about offenses ever committed, as ultra vires.303
Lobbying, negotiating, defining rules, and challenging rules are all
tasks that lawyers are well-equipped to engage in, and advocacy by
lawyers in these and other areas could prove effective for removing the
source of some of the dilemmas this article has described.
V. CONCLUSION
As immigration laws and enforcement of those laws have become
more severe, and as appointed counsel increases in the world of
immigration, the time is right to think thoroughly and creatively about
how immigration lawyers can be more effective, individually and
collectively, as the “immigration bar.” While the efforts to reduce the
worst practices and remove the worst offenders are critical, these
efforts are insufficient in the face of the enormous challenges and
burdens immigrants face in the removal system. A higher standard is
needed, and zealous advocacy is a critical piece of that high standard.
With zealous advocacy as the baseline, as a core, guiding principle for
immigration lawyers, lawyers will be empowered to take stronger
stances in defense of their clients—demanding every advantage
ethically permitted to advance the interested of their clients, without
crossing over into unethical behavior. As Abbe Smith exhorted in the
criminal context, “Although a defender must act within the bounds of
the law, he or she should engage in advocacy that is as close to the line
303

The question does not elicit legally relevant information for screening an
individual for admissibility under the Immigration and Nationality Act; the other more
narrowly tailored questions on the form do implement the admissibility screening
contained in the INA, but this question does not, and eliminating it would remove the
dilemma for practitioners.
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as possible, and, indeed, should test the line, if it is in the client’s
interest in doing so.”304 The same is true for those engaging in the
defense of immigrants facing removal. This Article has shown how
often this can be done without subverting existing rules, and calls upon
immigration practitioners to identify and challenge the barriers to
zealous advocacy that still remain. The nature of the task—defending
clients against removal to other countries, separation from their
families and lives they have built here—demands that we challenge the
borders of expected behavior in immigration court, by pushing against
prevailing norms, and raising the bar of what constitutes truly effective
lawyering.

304

Smith, supra note 55, at 89–91.

